


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East Europe

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Ilinden Day Celebrations Announced for 2 Aug

*AU2907144391 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 29 Jul 91*

[Text] [Announcer] The meeting of the public initiative committee for the celebrations of the Ilinden-Transfiguration Day uprising anniversary ended a short while ago.

All sociopolitical forces in Bulgaria have decided to participate in the celebrations, the announcement states.

On 2 August 1991, a solemn commemoration service will be held at the Sofia Aleksandur Nevski Cathedral, and flowers will be laid at the Unknown Soldier's Monument later.

On the same day, celebrations are scheduled to take place at Makedoniya Square in Blagoevgrad. Regional rallies will take place on 3 and 4 August in Gotse Delchev town, in Baldovo Village, and in the town of Petrich.

On 17 and 18 August, a people's rally will take place in the Strandzha Mountain [place name indistinct].

At the meeting of the initiative committee, Mr. Dimitur Gotsev, chairman of the Union of Cultural Societies of the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organizations [VMRO], expressed his organization's concern.

[Begin Gotsev recording] We realized to our regret that, for the last year and a half, the state institutions, the ruling parties, and the authorities have withdrawn from our joint National Front, which is of major importance to the Bulgarian people and for Bulgaria, and we are concerned that they are leaving us alone at the most critical moment. We, the refugees from Macedonia and Thrace, must defend ourselves against organized states, against tremendous resources that are used against us. We are expected to leave entire pages of our history, of our past and our present, empty, and we are expected to vacate our national territory and to deliver it into the hands of certain anti-Bulgarian [word indistinct].

Gentlemen, I am not exaggerating. You know what happened recently. Across our Western borders, they are organizing anti-Bulgarian rallies, demonstrations, and various other events at which everything Bulgarian is slandered. Last year they tried to hold a congress on Ilinden, which did not take place. We are grateful to the authorities for this. This year again, even last Saturday, an attempt was made to stage an even greater anti-Bulgarian event with the Albanians. We are grateful to the people who prevented this, but the danger is not over. The same people are ready today, tomorrow, or the day after to organize a similar meeting in Blagoevgrad, Sandanski, or Petrich, at which they, under all circumstances, are preparing to present an anti-Bulgarian program in which they categorically state that they are not Bulgarians, that we have to turn to Yugoslavia, that the parties there should be Macedonian, that the church

should join the Macedonian Church, and that the language not be Bulgarian. In other words, this is an anti-Bulgarian program that is being implemented before our eyes, on our territory, but there is no reaction, gentlemen. [end recording].

[Announcer] Mr. Mikhail Nedelchev, on behalf of the Radical Democratic Party, proposed that a discussion take place in Blagoevgrad prior to the celebrations on 2 August 1991, which he provisionally entitled "The Attitude of Bulgarian Political Parties to the Ilinden-Transfiguration Day Uprising." The idea was approved by Mr. Angel Akhryanov from the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party and by Mr. Filip Bokov from the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Mr. Bokov is reported as saying that the Macedonian question is part of the Bulgarian nationality question.

Prof. Dobrin Mitev also spoke at the session of the initiative committee. He stated that a resolute strike [boy] should be inflicted on the Macedonian Ilinden Organization one of these days because this is a nonconstitutional Bulgarian organization. His proposal was also supported by the Bulgarian Rakovski Officers' Legion, whose representative claimed that he has information on provocations being prepared by this organization.

All participants in the session agreed that the chief prosecutor and his office should adopt resolute measures against the Ilinden Organization. It was also decided that a Bulgarian representative delegation of the sociopolitical forces in the country should lay a wreath on the border between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the Deve Bair area [word indistinct]. The wreath should carry the inscription: "To those who perished for freedom from the Bulgarian people."

Provisions of Commercial Code Discussed

*91P20425A Sofia SOFIA NEWS in English
14, 21, 28 Jun 91*

[Three installments of a continuing article by Polya Panova: "Commercial Code"]

[14 Jun p 5]

[Text] The passage of the Commercial Code in May 1991 took Bulgaria an important step forward on the road to the replacement of the economic system. This act of Parliament set the legislative beginning of the transition from a centrally planned to a modern, market-oriented economy. The Code drew on the latest and most advanced statutory standards of Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain, Hungary and other European democracies, as well as on the standardization of European law of business associations.

The Commercial Code is an organizational law, laying down all forms of organization in which Bulgarian and foreign natural and juristic persons may conduct commercial (entrepreneurial) activities. The Code, however, does not cover the entire province of commercial law.

Commercial transactions and bankruptcy proceedings will be regulated in two separate pieces of legislation.

The Commercial Code applies equally to Bulgarian and foreign transactors. It grants equal opportunities to Bulgarian and foreign nationals to choose freely one of the forms of business organization provided for therein. One important advantage of the Code is the equal treatment of the organizational status of local and foreign persons and the lack of any restrictions or discriminatory standards with respect to the latter.

The Commercial Code details the forms of business organization in Bulgaria. They fall into basic two basic groups: corporate and non-corporate. A person wishing to carry out commercial activity may register as a single merchant or associate with other persons in one of the following business associations: general partnership, limited partnership, limited-liability company, joint-stock company, partnership limited by shares. Further on, the commercial partnerships themselves may associate into consortia or holding companies.

These forms of organization apply only to persons qualifying as merchants under the law. These are all natural and juristic persons who carry out commercial transactions by trade. The Code is inapplicable to persons exercising a liberal profession, to farmers trading their produce, to authors of works of art, literature and science and to other categories of persons explicitly listed in the law.

Each merchant must register, irrespective of whether he or she will conduct commercial activity solely or in association with other persons. The commercial registers are kept by the district courts. They state the particulars explicitly required under the law: company name, registered office, line of business, etc. The court advertizes the commercial register entries in the *Official Gazette*. The commercial registers are open to public inspection.

Each merchant conducts his business under a company name. The merchant is free to choose a company name which must appear in Bulgarian. The only restriction which the Commercial Code imposes on company names is that it must be true, i.e. that it should not prejudice public order and morals. Under the law, merchants may not register identical company names in one and the same population centre. A company name may be altered at any time at the request of the merchant. Apart from a company name, a merchant must have a registered office, which is the official address of the headquarters of his business.

In addition to the obligation to register, the Commercial Law obliges merchants to keep accounts of the flows of their business assets. The Accountancy Act lays down all rules for bookkeeping and inventory taking and the accounting periods. Under the Commercial Code, regularly kept books of account and the entries therein are admissible evidence for commercial transactions conducted between merchants.

Each merchant is free to open a branch outside the population centre where his registered office is located. In this case he is only obliged to enter the branch into the commercial register of the court exercising jurisdiction over the place where the branch is headquartered. Under the Code, merchants may carry out their business through general, special or universal agents whose legal status is detailed in the general provisions of the act.

[21 Jun p 6]

[Text] Under the Commercial Code, the citizens of Bulgaria may conduct commercial activities solely, independently or in association with other persons. A natural person wishing to carry out business independently must register as a single merchant. To be eligible to do so, he or she must be legally capable and resident of the country. Therefore, a foreign national may not register as single merchant before obtaining residence in Bulgaria according to the appropriate procedure.

If a person wishes to carry out business in association with other persons, he must form a commercial partnership. Characteristically, commercial partnerships have legal personality different from that of their founders and members and thus enjoy and are subject to rights and duties of their own. Under the Commercial Code, a single person can also establish a commercial partnership called one-man company.

The law lays down a principle according to which the types of business associations that can be formed in Bulgaria are limited to those explicitly regulated in the Commercial Code. These are general partnership, limited partnership, limited-liability company, joint-stock company and partnership limited by shares. This key provision should be taken into account by foreign persons who may not establish or participate in a type of commercial partnership other than those regulated by the Bulgarian Commercial Code even if it is admissible under their domestic law.

Foreign natural and juristic persons are basically free to choose the form of business association with the exception of those who intend to go into banking and insurance: they can only establish joint-stock companies or cooperative societies.

Commercial partnerships may be formed by both Bulgarian and foreign nationals or juristic persons. Legal capability is the only requirement which the law sets to natural persons. There is no restriction on the number of partnerships in which a person may participate.

The new legal framework for commercial partnerships in Bulgaria is consistent with the fundamental requirements and principles of European law of business associations. Just as in other countries of Europe, a partnership is established at a constituent meeting which makes a decision to incorporate it, adopts the articles of association and elects the governing bodies. The memorandum and articles of association must be unanimously adopted by all founding members. Once constituted, a

partnership has to be registered at the district court, and the court has to advertise its registration in the *Official Gazette*. A partnership may transact valid business after these formalities are completed.

Each member of a commercial partnership has to make pecuniary or non-pecuniary contributions to its capital. The type and size of the contribution is specified in the memorandum of association. The form of the non-pecuniary contribution is facilitated by the Code. Foreign nationals should know that if the non-pecuniary contribution consists of the transfer rights, which under Bulgarian law is a notarial transaction, it may be transacted simply in writing with notarized signatures. The rest of the rights, which need no notarization under the law, are transferred by the general procedure as applicable. The Commercial Code grants yet another important concession of considerable interest to foreign investors: the partner's contributions are exempt from state and local rates, taxes and duties.

The provisions concerning the appraisal of non-pecuniary contribution is also important for foreign nationals. The law requires that the contributor submit a notarized appraisal of his non-pecuniary contribution, made by one or [as published] three experts on a list approved by the chairman of the General Accounting Office. The law explicitly bans the appraisal of non-pecuniary contributions in the memorandum of association to exceed the price named by the experts. In case of disputes on the appraisal, any party may refer the matter to the district court exercising jurisdiction over the partnership's registered office and apply for a revision of the appraisal. If the court appraisal, too, does not satisfy the contributor, he may replace the non-pecuniary contribution by a pecuniary one or withdraw from the partnership.

Under the Code, a commercial partnership should carry out its business within the law and in accordance with its articles of association. Violating these, the partnership runs the risk of being declared void. Legal transactions carried out on behalf of a voided partnership entail joint and unlimited liability for the transactors. If while in business a partnership makes decisions contravening the law or the articles of association, they may be revoked by the district court on a submission by any partner.

[28 Jun p 6]

[Text] The two types of personal partnership which can be formed under the Commercial Code are the general partnership and the limited partnership. They may be established by both Bulgarian and foreign nationals.

The law defines a general partnership as an association for the conduct of commercial transactions under a common company name in which the partners have joint and unlimited liability for all partnership debts and obligations in full.

The following requirements have to be met for the formation of a general partnership: First, a memorandum of association must be drawn up in writing with notarized signatures of the partners. The memorandum should state the following particulars: the names and the addresses of the partners (if natural persons) or the names and registered offices (if corporate), the type and amount of their contribution and the appraisal thereof, the manner of management and representation, as well as the method of decision-making. Secondly, the general partnership has to be declared at the district court to be entered in the commercial register. Persons representing the partnership must submit specimens of their signatures upon registration.

The Commercial Code lays down the principle of correspondence between partners' rights and duties. Therefore, those who are personally and unlimitedly liable for the partnership debts ought to be unlimitedly capable of participating in the management of partnership affairs. Even though it is admissible under the law to assign the management to one or several partners or to another person, certain more important transactions and legal actions require the consent of all partners.

Such transactions include the acquisition and disposal of real rights to real property, the appointment of a managing director who is not a partner, the contracting of loans exceeding the amounts fixed in the memorandum of association. Along with that, a partner who is not involved directly in management, has the right to inquire personally into the partnership affairs, to inspect the business books, the partnership and other papers and to demand explanations from the managing director.

In its dealings with third parties, a general partnership is liable to the extent of its assets. Pecuniary claims are executed, first, from the partnership assets, and if these are insufficient, from the partnerships' property. The partners are liable to the creditors personally and jointly.

A limited partnership is the second type of personal partnership explicitly regulated by the Commercial Code. Unlike a general partnership, one or more partners in a limited partnership have unlimited and joint liability for the partnership debts and the liability of the rest is limited to the amount of the agreed contribution. The foreign nationals wishing to form or join a limited partnership in the territory of Bulgaria ought to know that the law requires the general partners to hold a mandatory minimum stake of one tenth in the capital.

The statutory regulations for the formation of a limited partnership are the same as for the general partnership. A memorandum of association in writing is required with notarized signatures of partners. The limited partnership's company name must contain the acronym "KD" and the name of at least one of the general partners. For valid formation, the general partners must apply for the entry of the partnership in the commercial register of the district court and must submit specimens of their signatures.

The management and representation of a limited partnership is effected by the general partners. The applicable principle in this case is that those who assume the burdens and the risks must be entitled to the benefit and the management of partnership affairs. Conversely, if a limited partner transacts business on behalf and on account of the partnership without explicit authorization, he is personally liable and may not bind the partnership. This, however, does not mean that the limited partners are entirely without rights. They are entitled to their due share of the profits and may inspect the partnership's business books and require a copy of the annual accounts.

Under Bulgarian law, personal commercial partnerships are formed and operate on a voluntary basis. Any partner is free to leave a partnership at any time on a written six-month notice to the rest of the partners. A partnership is wound up voluntarily upon the consent of the partners, upon the death of a partner who is a natural person or, respectively, the dissolution of a partner which is a juristic person, or upon the bankruptcy of any of the partners, save as otherwise agreed. Compulsory winding-up follows the placing of the partnership in bankruptcy or under a court ruling in cases determined by law.

Delegation in France To Discuss Power Supplies

*AU3007075191 Sofia BTA in English 2001 GMT
29 Jul 91*

[Text] Paris, July 29 (BTA)—Integrating Bulgaria's energy system in the European one based on complex and broad cooperation with the developed European

countries—this was the project discussed at the first meeting of the Bulgarian Government delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandur Tomov which is paying a working visit to France.

At the talks the delegation had with the leadership of the biggest electric power producer and exporter in Europe "Electricite de France" it was agreed that groups, commercial banks and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development would be also enrolled for the implementation of the project. The project is in compliance with the results of the meeting Deputy Prime Minister Tomov had in Vienna to discuss the development and the prospects of Bulgaria's power engineering.

The opinion was expressed that if the project is endorsed, it would mean integration with the European energy system on the one hand and on the other it would serve as a bridge to the Soviet Union.

Later on, at a meeting with high-ranking officials of the Thompson Corporation, the biggest French group making utilitarian and professional electronic equipment, future investments and the training of managers were discussed.

The Bulgarian delegation had also talks with the director general of Credit Lyonnais, France's second biggest bank which has been acting as most powerful state and inter-bank creditor. The two sides discussed the opening of credit lines and the possible crediting of larger projects. The possibility was considered of providing assistance in the field of privatization.

The delegation met with Mr. Jean Tubonne, member of the leadership of the Gaullist Party. The two sides informed each other about the political situation.

Nationalists Critical of U.S. Stand

Economy Troubles Linked to Faulty Program

91CH0713A Bratislava SLOVENSKY NAROD
in Slovak 4 Jul 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Vladimir Tatarko: "The Road to a Banana Republic"]

[Text] Last week there were quite a few things that irked me. But most of all it was a report from Washington according to which an adviser to the U.S. Foreign Minister announced that James Baker gave consent to the Yugoslav Federal Government to suppress the separatist movement in Slovenia. Even though shortly afterward the U.S. Foreign Minister denied that he made the statement, it is evident that without consent from the White House and apparently also other West European governments the Yugoslav People's Army could hardly engage in bombing the Maribor or Ljubljana airports, occupy all border crossings and with full armed power enter Slovenia's capital. It seems that the United States, this new-fashioned mercenary and protector of a powerful supranational financial lobby has spread its strong nets also over the countries of southeastern Europe.

But its principal military tent is in Czecho-Slovakia. It is here that it has its most faithful advocates. I am thinking especially of V. Havel, the world-renowned literary figure and CSFR president, who after prolonged applause in the U.S. Congress earned the halo of a great European humanist and democrat, or of V. Klaus who even before the velvet revolution was tutored by the best American economists and taught how to deal with our socialist economy. It seems that the lessons were successful. For within a single year of his economic reform he has brought the entire Czechoslovak economy to its knees. Thanks to it there are now in Slovakia on the brink of bankruptcy not only factories producing military equipment but also many textile and construction enterprises, and according to conservative estimates nearly half a million people will be jobless by the end of the year. The majority of enterprises are insolvent already now and those that can earn their keep after Klaus purposely devalued the koruna lack the means to purchase new, modern technology from abroad. So they are left with only one course—accepting the humiliating terms of foreign entrepreneurs. For now these are still buckled in their starting blocks and waiting for the shot from the starter's pistol.

But the shot has not been coming. Slovakia is not yet giving up. Already in Meciar's time efforts were made to seek new commercial contacts in the FRG and Italy and found a Russian-Slovak bank. Recently, even contrary to the will of U.S. congressmen, [Slovakia] sold also its tanks to Syria. For this reason too Meciar's government had to fall and be replaced. The new government, marked by the Piastany affair, would lease the entire Tatra Mountains to New Hampshire entrepreneurs if only it could do so. The fact that the pro-Castle LIDOVE

NOVINY is not railing against it and its prime minister can mean only one thing: It is in close contact with West European and American business circles. There is much to support this conclusion and it seems that also its new economic program recently rejected by the parliament is merely a program for the further continuation of the Slovak Republic's economic decline.

Well, this is evidently what it is all about. To have the nation fall to its knees, to have us rent the Tatra to the Americans and Piastany to the Austrians and export, say, the Detva BVP's to the whole world and augment foreign capital abroad. Because it is clear that our own, national capital will hardly even exist. But if it does after all, it is sure to be smaller than for instance what we had under Masaryk the Good Father. A year is enough and nothing will be left of Slovakia—this is what some prognosticators are saying. Perhaps this is the reason why the U.S. foreign minister has displayed such largesse and affinity toward the Yugoslav Federal Government. For the case of Slovenia and Croatia could become dangerous and contagious. After all, today they know well even in the White House that the moment of freedom has arrived also for the small nations of Europe. But time is working for them and therefore they contrive various moratoriums, overlong discussions, nonsensical pacts and agreements. In Slovenia, Croatia, as also in Slovakia. But these three small nations differ greatly. While the Slovenes and Croats have already given themselves independence, we are evidently still waiting for someone to bestow it on us. Well, if we are going to wait for another while we can expect at best a banana republic.

Slovak Patriotism Preferred

91CH0713B Bratislava SLOVENSKÉ NARODNE
NOVINY in Slovak 5 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by Peter Strelinger: "Slovakia—My Fatherland"]

[Text] Our "civilian" minister of national defense recently waxed enthusiastic over the patriotism of American soldiers. He had just returned from America which was pompously celebrating victory in the Persian Gulf war, where the Czechoslovak Army too had its minuscule involvement. "If only" we knew how to stir such patriotism also in the hearts of our soldiers, sighed our "war" minister. Inwardly I too posed a question: Where is our soldier's fatherland? It is a question which many of us surely asked ourselves in the memorable year 1968 when we looked on passively as the armies of five "allied" states were trampling our freedom, our fatherland. These days when after nearly 23 years the last Soviet soldier is leaving our country we again ask ourselves a futile question: And why did we not defend ourselves then?! I know, I know, we are aware of the reasons, all of us too who then "learned from the lesson": Had our army tried to resist it would have been suicide, much blood would have flowed.... And even if it is useless to ask, would "our" soldier have fought? I am convinced that he would have fought, that he was ready

even to die heroically for his fatherland. And how would America, how would that entire democratic Western Europe have responded? Let's go no farther in asking such illusory "what if" questions.... Because we now know how then-American President Johnson responded when Brezhnev informed him of the invasion: Occupation? That's your business [Eto vashe delo]! Oh well, Czecho-Slovakia is not Kuwait. In 1968 Czecho-Slovakia was in the same situation as in 1938. That is, Munich was repeated. And we were thrown on the mercies of a five-headed hydra. The second entry of Soviet tanks meant a brutal awakening for the Czechs and Slovaks. But the arrival of and occupation by the German (GDR), Hungarian, Polish, and Bulgarian armies was an equally swinish act—and this too we ought not to forget. Let us not forget, even though we may have forgiven! With this memory we, I think, were united, Czech and Slovak, as we entered the period after the November overturn. And the men then entering the government or ascending the Prague Castle promised us Slovaks equal rights and self-determination "up to complete separation." Let us realize one thing (and this includes Minister Dobrovsky): That generations of Slovaks massaged by the unitarist Prague policy and an all-embracing internationalism have been compelled to forget that their fatherland is Slovakia, even though within the framework of Czecho-Slovakia. Like it nor not, it is not possible to put the civic principle into opposition with the national principle. A free citizen equals a free nation equals a free state! I assume that when Bedrich Smetana was composing the My Fatherland cyclus he was not exactly thinking of the Tatra. This is something our brethren at the Vltava who get "goose pimples" when hearing about "Slovak sovereignty" ought to realize—and take from there their "army education" in patriotism—instead of sighing over the American flag!

Christian Democratic State Treaty Draft

91CH0712A Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK
in Slovak 11 Jul 91 p 3

["Text" of 22 June draft from Christian Democratic Movement: "State Treaty Between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic on the Common State"—first paragraph is SLOVENSKY DENNIK introduction]

[Text] This draft was approved by the Council of the Christian Democratic Movement on 22 June 1991 as a guideline for our deputies in the preparation of the Slovak Republic's Constitution and a treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic on state powers arrangement.

The Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council, representing the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, proceeding from the right of nations to self-determination and sovereignty of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, giving due credit to all the positive aspects and contributions resulting until now from the concurrent life of both

nations and nationalities in a Common State, and striving in the new conditions created by the successful struggle for freedom to base the shared life of citizens of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in a Common State on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and respect for the sovereignty of national states, have agreed as follows:

Article I

- (1) The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as sovereign states voluntarily form a union of two equal states—a Common State.
- (2) The Common State is a sovereign and democratic state based on respect for the freedoms and rights of man and citizen. The basic rights and freedoms of citizens and guarantees of their observance are the same throughout the entire Common State.

Article II

- (1) The basic law of the Common State is its Constitution adopted by the legislative body. The Constitution shall derive from this treaty and refer to it in its preamble.
- (2) First Alternative: The legislative body of the Common State consists of two chambers: the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council. Its laws apply to the territory of both Republics if both chambers voted for them.

Second Alternative: The legislative body of the Common State consists of two chambers: one composed of directly elected deputies in the Republics and one composed of equal numbers of National Council deputies delegated by the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council.

- (3) The Constitution of the Common State adopted by its legislative body becomes effective only after its approval by the legislative bodies of the Republics. The legislative bodies of the Republics shall express their assent by a constitutional act.
- (4) Laws of the Common State and individual Republics shall harmonize with the current legislation of the European Communities.
- (5) Entry of the Common State into international integrative groupings is subject to ratification by National Councils by means of a constitutional act.

Article III

- (1) The territory of the Common State consists of the territory of the Czech Republic and the territory of the Slovak Republic. Borders of the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic may be changed only with consent of that Republic.
- (2) A citizen of each of the two Republics is also a citizen of the Common State. Citizen of one Republic has equal rights on the territory of the other Republic and equal

obligations as a citizen of that Republic. No one can be deprived of citizenship against his will.

Article IV

(1) The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic on their own volition and in their own interest have agreed that they entrust the following competencies (powers) to the bodies of the Common State:

a) Exercise of the office of the head of the Common State by a President.

b) Defense of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic and protection of the security of the Common State by the joint forces of both Republics.

c) Coordination of foreign policy, representation of the Common State in the agreed-upon international associations and organizations and the diplomatic representation of the Common State.

d) Common currency and common currency policy (currency union);

e) State budget of the Common State.

f) Coordination of a joint customs policy (customs union).

g) Tax (Republic contribution) flowing to the Common State's budget and a tax harmonization.

h) General technical normalization.

(2) In matters entrusted to the competency of the Common State, Section (1) Items a) to h), its legislative body exercises legislative power.

(3) The legislative body of the Common State as well as its executive agencies are duty-bound in their powers to observe the Constitution of the Czech Republic and of the Slovak Republic.

Article V

(1) To exercise the powers of the Common State the following executive bodies shall be established:

a) President of the Common State

b) Ministry of Defense

c) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

d) Ministry of Finance

e) Council for Currency and Currency Issuing Policy

f) Committee for Customs Policy

g) Committee for Technical Normalization.

(2) The Government of the Common State shall consist of the prime minister and deputy prime minister, defense minister, foreign affairs minister, and finance minister.

(3) For the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Finance the Constitution shall establish the office of a State Secretary in cabinet rank and it shall be applied as a principle that the holder of this office is a member of the Republic which is not occupying the minister's chair. This principle shall be applied also to the Offices of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, in the sense that if the prime minister is a member of the Czech nation the deputy prime minister will be a member of the Slovak nation, and vice versa.

(4) In the composition of councils and committees exercising state executive power the principle of parity representation of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic shall be strictly observed. At the head of the councils and committees are chairmen with vice chairmen deputizing for them, and in filling these posts the principle of having the alternate according to nationality shall be applied. The chairmen and deputy chairmen are appointed by the Governments of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic by mutual agreement.

Article VI

(1) Agreement and coordination in matters of common interest for the Republics and the Common State which do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Common State according to Article IV Items a) to h) shall be set up by the Governments of the Republics of their executive bodies on their own powers or where necessary in agreement with the Government of the Common State. The coordinating or expert committees are composed on strict parity basis of representatives of both Republics and in their activity proceed according to directives agreed upon by the founders.

(2) The coordinating or expert working committees are headed by a chairman and a deputy, again respecting the principle of the alternate being of the other Republic. Both are nominated by the founders by mutual agreement.

Article VII

(1) Legal regulations issued by bodies of the Common State are valid without restriction in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

(2) The Common State ceases to exist with the withdrawal of the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic, or by its dissolution. The Common State can be dissolved only on the basis of a referendum on its entire territory and on the motion of its legislative body in which the dissolution is favored by citizens of the Czech Republic or citizens of Slovak Republic. In either case the successors to the Common State are both national Republics.

Article VIII

(1) This treaty becomes effective upon approval by the Czech National Council and the Slovak National

Council in a manner required for adopting a constitutional act of the Republic.

(2) A change in the powers of the Common State can be effected only by a change in or amendment to the state treaty, and in the manner required for adopting a constitutional act of the Republic.

(3) The activity of the present houses of the Federal Assembly shall cease with the expiration of the current election term.

(4) Current legislation by the CSFR Federal Assembly remains valid until its replacement by new laws in accordance with this state treaty.

Entrepreneur Leader Palotas Interviewed

91CH0722A Budapest VILAG in Hungarian 10 Jul 91
pp 38-39

[Part two of a two part interview with Janos Palotas, National Assembly representative and National Association of Entrepreneurs president, by Tamas Falus; place and date not given: "In for the Long Term Part II"—part one of interview was published in JPRS-EER-91-111 on 30 July]

[Text] In Part I of the interview, Janos Palotas, the National Assembly representative and National Association of Entrepreneurs president discussed the general feeling, the role of, and the opportunities available to the entrepreneur slated to remain part of Hungarian society and of the economy in the long term. On this occasion the popular entrepreneur politician expresses his views about available loan funds and about VOSZ [National Association of Entrepreneurs], and says a few words about his own enterprise.

[Falus] More and more is talked about various loan funds these days. Government economic policy makers and entrepreneurs pin great hopes to these. To what extent would loans be of help to starting entrepreneurs?

[Palotas] One should not start an enterprise on credit, except in the form of short-term, one-year loans for working capital. If we want to realize an idea we must find capital which is invested by the person to whom the money belongs in order to salvage the value his money. An enterprise established on credit will not support a life long career, because no good idea provides a return if burdened by a 40-percent interest. And one must not forget that inflation above the 50 percent rate can no longer be managed. Nowadays, the credit system is guided by some central loan fund, there are flexible interest rates and no guarantee for not having to pay a much higher interest rate with let's say the third or fourth installment payment. An incomplete investment is worthless.

[Falus] But citizens struggle with a shortage of capital, the announced Start and Egzisztencia loan funds appear more attractive than the average loan, despite the high interest rates!

[Palotas] Unfortunately, the things I said before also apply to these preferential loans, because their terms are favorable only in a relative sense. The interest on the Start loan fund is 75 percent of the central bank reference interest rate that prevails at any given point in time, and that too can rise. All this serves only to blunt the risk. These loans make real sense only if a person has his own capital, deposits it in the bank and earns interest on the deposit. Banks pay higher interest rates than the preferential interest rate the investor pays.

[Falus] Many people may be saddened by this view, because these loan funds were created to support citizens struggling with a lack of capital!

[Palotas] The Start and the Egzisztencia loan funds were intended to contribute to the establishment of many tens of thousands of ventures. But let's take a look at the official economic policy. Demand must be tightened this year and even next year. Accordingly, should this be understood to mean that tens of thousands of new firms be established to satisfy the same or a declining demand? I must congratulate the government for this idea! A drastic growth in unemployment is the government's responsibility. If the government's misleading strategy is good enough and the government succeeds in persuading a large number of unemployed people to become entrepreneurs, a significant number of these entrepreneurs could become failed entrepreneurs as time goes by. And at that point the government cannot be blamed. Instead the entrepreneur will be regarded as stupid, because he decided to become an entrepreneur and even received a preferential loan, and yet failed. This is how an unemployed person becomes a failed entrepreneur, and in this political system the tragedy of an individual is of no interest to anyone. One should also be aware of the fact that half the number of entrepreneurs go broke even in economies which function normally. Anyone forced to become an entrepreneur in a bad economic environment can easily use up the assets he accumulated earlier. For example, if someone is forced today to become a taxi driver and earns the money he needs to live on, he will discover two years later, when he must buy a new car, that in reality he has "consumed" his own car. This matter amounts to insolence of such proportion that I, as an economist, as a person familiar with entrepreneurial methodology have great difficulty in telling this story in the parliament politely as politicians do—nevertheless, I do so.

[Falus] On the other hand—so goes the counter argument—it would be insolence not to provide the support offered to entrepreneurs by the German Government!

[Palotas] I did not say that the money should not be given to them! Even though from a professional standpoint I also regard as inappropriate the manner in which these loans were announced, because the amounts that may be taken advantage of suffice only to start up between 1,000 and 1,500 ventures at most. Thus, there will be so many applicants that the majority will certainly not receive the amount of money requested. But if the availability of these funds were to be announced let's say for construction industry entrepreneurs in Borsod County, the number of applicants would be just right and the borrowed amounts would produce results. I blame an economic policy which permits the borrowing of these funds. If the economy is to be scaled down and restarted from its ruins at one time or another, reorganization of the economy should not be stimulated in an era of cutbacks. Doing so would be correct only if we were to say that not the entire economy should be scaled down but only the sick part of it. A selective economy would impose restrictions in certain fields, while other fields would be boosted. But we have not yet gotten this far. Restrictions are of general applicability, presumably as

part of a coerced course. I do not agree with this and I do not believe that votes cast in the elections granted confidence to the government to make everyone perish. I disagree with those who claim that "operating on a prior illness is painful." Yes, but if my ear hurts they would not amputate my leg with which I have not experienced any trouble! The private economy is not sick, and yet they are operating on it. This amounts to charlatantry.

[Falus] VOSZ' role, its function as an interest group has changed recently, partly as a result of the system change. In what ways does the Association exert its efforts on behalf of a growing group of entrepreneurs?

[Palotas] VOSZ' role changes from day to day. I believe that the association is the first organization in a new social formation which well preceded the system change. The economy tolerates VOSZ more than the political sphere does, and thus, VOSZ did not have to be reborn in the wake of the system change. But priorities, when and how to emphasize certain things change. The mistaken concept between 1982 and 1988 was that privately owned ventures could exist, but only small ventures were permitted to exist. Thereafter, they said that enterprising in the service sector would be permissible, and then that X percentage of the economy could be in private hands. Today, on the other hand, we must struggle to make them believe that strong temporary centralization is not needed nowadays, and that a state role need not be played at all. Specifics questions must be asked today to find out what kinds of decisions are needed to accomplish the specifics. Another role VOSZ must play relates to the fact that the entrepreneur has become an employer. This had no significance during the 1980's when the number of employees in a private firm were limited to a maximum of 30, 60, or 100 persons. Although today the unions draw the limits of power with the state as the employer, we must increasingly prepare ourselves to play a new role when the private sector and the trade unions become the lead actors, and when in this play the state appears only as a curio item. We must consciously prepare ourselves for this kind of interest reconciliation. The fact that VOSZ, as the first hard-core, owner-employer organization in East Europe, has been given membership in the background organization of the U.N. International Labor Organization is a logical consequence of this, and this occurred in recognition of our achievements. This indicates tremendous recognition, and we must continue to deserve it. In the aftermath of the system change the parties should use the economic information they receive, but they should not endeavor to repoliticize the economy. Today's political leaders too often heard the statement that "power thrives where ownership exists." Thus, those who hold power today would like to acquire key positions in the banking system so as to be able to influence businesses. We must and we will stand up against this practice.

[Falus] According to public opinion surveys you are now running in dead heat, head to head with one of the most popular politicians, President of the Republic Arpad

Goncz. In other words, an entrepreneur took the top position in popularity rating. In what way and since when did the country's most liked entrepreneur engage himself in enterprising?

[Palotas] I believe that a situation in which an entrepreneur enjoys the highest popularity rating together with another person whose equal rating must be regarded as an honor is unique in the entire world. I regard all of this as important and I continue to fight for this for two reasons. First, because a popularity rating like this may turn around the people's view of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have been spat upon for 40 years. Success oriented enterprising citizens represent civil values which were unfortunately torn in half and left out of social development. Even today I regard the enhancement and development of this value system as my function. Second, I often feel that I am walking in one direction on a one-way street while hundreds of people walk in the opposite direction. And I am not certain whether those hundred people are stupid.... In such instances one becomes uncertain of himself, could I have read the one-way sign incorrectly? But I need to be reaffirmed in my views before I fall in line with the hundred people and become the hundred and first person who walks the opposite way. As far as my own enterprise is concerned, I have been enterprising ever since 1982. At first I established a productive firm which received much coverage on television, and which pursued activities which one can see on the street. But I do not like to discuss exactly what that activity is. It began as perhaps the best known venture in Central Europe, it operated primarily on the basis of orders received from abroad. This became a factory in 1988, and I left it. Then it became a stock corporation and I became one of its owners. In 1984 I established a family enterprise which still operates successfully as a consulting, investment, and software design and sales firm. At this time almost 500 ventures administer their affairs with the help of that software. The software is good because the firms hand it down to each other. I do not believe that it should be sold as the "Palotas Software," because this would only cause confusion. One should not take advantage of his personal popularity in business dealings. On the other hand I should not deny the fact that I am an entrepreneur, moreover a successful one, and I should not deny that I am not one of the poorest entrepreneurs and that my firm makes regular investments, and that is how I own to a smaller or greater extent more than ten firms.

[Falus] And do you have time to involve yourself in your enterprises along with your political function?

[Palotas] By now the ventures are carried on primarily by my wife with whom I completed the university, and with whom I have worked together from the outset. Only the centers of gravity have changed. In the beginning she played a greater role in the family, I was busy starting and operating ventures. This has now changed to the extent that taking care of the family remained her job, and to top it off, she also manages the ventures.... Everywhere in the world, politicians are sustained by their families.

Malopolska Leader on Role of Solidarity

91EP0595A Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish
20 Jun 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Jan Dziadon, deputy chairman of the Malopolska Regional Board of Solidarity, by Leslaw Maleszka; place and date not given: "We Don't Want Solidarity To Act in the Role of a Mere Chronic Claimant"]

[Text] [Maleszka] Let us forget history for a moment and try to define the differences in programs of action or goals between present-day Solidarity and the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] or the Solidarity of 1980.

[Dziadon] The differences are substantial. At its Second Congress the idea that Solidarity is to be a mere chronic claimant was rejected, although it was also pointed out that the government on its part does not fully appreciate the complexity of the circumstances under which we have to act nowadays.

[Maleszka] As of 1 January it was known that gas and power rates would rise. The causes are known: the conversion to hard currencies as the basis for trade with the USSR, our principal supplier of natural gas, and the mine subsidies. Well, the Malopolska Solidarity Region is sponsoring a strike and, of course, does not regard it as an antigovernment activity.

[Dziadon] We are not protesting the higher power rates themselves. However, the decision on this matter was taken without following the legal procedure of consulting our trade union.

[Maleszka] In other words, you are declaring a 1-hour strike at all these factories because Solidarity does not like the negotiating procedure?

[Dziadon] This is not a question of a mere formality. We need the negotiations [with the government] in order to feel like an equal partner. Moreover, negotiations provide a natural occasion for keeping the public informed about the economic problems of the country and publicizing the rationales and arguments in favor of a given policy. Both the first [Mazowiecki] and the second [Walesa] noncommunist governments make the same mistake of refusing a dialogue with the society, refusing to explain the nature of their decisions and placing little emphasis on keeping the society informed.

The Central Trade Union Office and the Plant Trade Union Committee

[Maleszka] In a word the society lacks rapport with the government. But in that case, does it have rapport with the trade unions? For the situation is so disorganized that some factories are striking while others refuse to join the protest action, and likewise some plant trade union committees proclaim strikes without consulting at all the head office or regional office of Solidarity, and pursue arbitrary policies of their own.

[Dziadon] In the nature of things, Solidarity has fewer resources for keeping the public informed than does the government. But aside from this, it should be kept in mind that the situation at different factories differs. The economic situation of enterprises also varies, and hence the mood of the work forces likewise varies. We are fully aware of our inability to coordinate all that which should be coordinated.

[Maleszka] Is not this proof of the weakness of Solidarity, of its having forfeited the chance to pursue a uniform and coherent policy on all important national issues?

[Dziadon] Solidarity is not the Army. Our statute grants far-reaching autonomy to all of its elements. No resolution is absolutely binding on all the cells that are formally subordinated to the head office. This has been so from the very beginning; besides, Solidarity is an organization based on the intrinsic autonomy of its elements rather than on some "unity of action" and centralization.

[Maleszka] This is an unprecedented situation to West Europe as a whole. Over there, any trade unionist is aware that the economy is a system of linked vessels, and hence a wage raise at one factory causes a recession and unemployment elsewhere. Incidentally, that is why collective bargaining agreements are ratified by the head offices of trade union federations.

[Dziadon] This situation will apply here once our system becomes at least in part like the economic system in West Europe. At present, however, making such comparisons is a great oversimplification.

The Economy and Justice

[Maleszka] What does it really mean, "Solidarity wants to be a cogoverning trade union"?

[Dziadon] It means that for many months now Solidarity plant trade union committees at a number of enterprises have been the sole force prompting structural changes. The economic reform does not just mean new regulations and principles. It also is a complex social process. If the changes in the economy are not perceived as the way to more favorable solutions for broad social groups, they will be blocked at workplaces. We fear moreover the growth of social resistance owing to particular mistakes of the government's policy.

[Maleszka] Examples?

[Dziadon] They are so many. Let me give you just one. Early this year the work forces were upset by the fact that enterprise managers and worker councils were to retain a percentage of enterprise profits. Last year in the spring the issue of the distribution of profits was discussed in the Sejm, but nothing came of it; it turned out that the pertinent law was poorly drafted. Thereupon, without any further discussion, and without any publicity, the law was amended to allow for profit distribution. In

January there appeared the letter by Minister Lewandowski recommending that a control packet of stock in the enterprises privatized by the liquidation procedure be sold to the previous management of these enterprises. Is the coincidence in time of these two facts accidental? At any rate, this matter has evoked tremendous ferment and outrage among workers.

[Maleszka] I listen but I don't understand. First of all, the government's powers over state enterprises are nowadays greatly diminished. Actually, all the decisions are made by worker councils, which are democratically elected by the work forces. In these councils Solidarity nowadays wields tremendous influence.

[Dziadon] To state that enterprises govern themselves is erroneous insofar as they are bound by an extremely rigorous and rigid legal-financial system determined by the central agencies.

[Maleszka] Under this rigorous system some companies become money-makers while others go under. Is that because the state and the government have selected particular companies to either promote or, for a change, oppress?

[Dziadon] Of course not. However, the [public's] feelings of elementary justice should not be disregarded. If the management of a plant causes it to become bankrupt but personally profits from it through its private companies, and if moreover the assets of the bankrupted plant are sold at special ridiculously low discount prices to the very individuals who had ruined it, it is hardly surprising that a mood of discontent and grievance, threatening an explosion at any moment, arises at the workplaces. Managers who brought plants to bankruptcy enjoy immunity and, to boot, derive profits from it. The Intervention Section of the Regional Solidarity Board has extensive proof documenting this practice. We have repeatedly notified the public prosecutor's office about such instances, but so far without effect.

He Who Rules Bears the Responsibility

[Maleszka] Would not it therefore be fair to condemn some worker-council activists as well? Their powers in many matters exceed those of the management. Yet, worker councils bear literally no responsibility.

[Dziadon] The system of responsibility for decisions taken at enterprises is legally defined. But as for the imperfections of the present system of worker self-government in the Polish economy, that is another matter.

[Maleszka] There is a rising tide of opinions that Solidarity at workplaces intervenes directly into the staffing of managerial positions. There arises a kind of new "rule by telephone" based on personal friendships and connections, with trade unionists either firing enterprise managers or forcing them to make decisions advantageous to the interests of the trade union.

[Dziadon] Anyone who refers to some "new nomenklatura" here either does not understand what the nomenklatura had been like or is acting in bad faith. It is one thing to make specific personal recommendations and quite another to demand changes in the principles of personnel policy. Our demands in this respect are often either ignored or bluntly rejected by the government. And as for "rule by telephone," we mean isolated instances that always have taken and will continue to take place. In the end, this is nothing unusual. Policy is based. In the end, it is nothing unusual that various groups or lobbies are trying to use the resources at their disposal in order to influence particular personnel decisions. So far as Solidarity is concerned, this issue is blown out of proportion and exploited by its ideological enemies. Consider that Solidarity, until quite recently representing an extremely broad social movement, has been, in measure with the emergence of new democratic representative social groupings, retreating from its concern with various issues and domains and focusing on purely trade-unionist issues.

Unionist Businesses

[Maleszka] The German trade union DGB owns one-fourth of communal housing in the FRG. How is Solidarity entering into the new economic reality? Do you intend to remain a destitute trade union specializing solely in social justice?

[Dziadon] Two rooms away from the one we are talking in is located an embryonic Solidarity labor placement office. We are awaiting a reply from Minister Boni to our application for a permit to engage in this activity. Then there is the year-old Solidarity-owned enterprise, "Malopolska Region Economic Fund," along with nearly 20 joint-stock companies established on the initiative of Solidarity plant trade union committees, which engage in a broad variety of activities ranging from the management of factory cafeterias through repair operations to commercial and consulting activities, which we are developing through the "Malopolska Fund."

[Maleszka] Thank you for the interview.

Liberal-Democratic Leader Views Party Program

91EP0581A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 27,
6 Jul 91 p 3

[Interview with Donald Tusk, chairman of the Main Administration of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, by Marek Henzler; place and date not given: "This Is Not the Time of Liberals"]

[Text] [Henzler] In the KLD [Liberal-Democratic Congress] bulletin, you are described as follows: "He is not an Englishman, he is not a shareholder of McDonald's, [but] a well-known liquidator." The latter fact has to do with your membership in the RSW [Workers' Cooperative Publishing House] Liquidation Committee. How would you yourself, as a person new to the political arena, supplement this characterization?

[Tusk] I am a Gdanskian...

[Henzler] Today that is simply a profession!

[Tusk] In the malicious context presented by those from Warsaw, yes, but being a Gdanskian also has a deeper meaning. I have Kashubian roots; my family has lived in Gdansk for several generations. When I was thirteen, there was the explosion of December 1970, [my] first, quite dramatic, political experience. I began my studies in 1976, and quickly encountered meetings of the Student Self-Defense Committee. In Gdansk, opposition activity in the late 1970's meant contact with the Free Trade Unions, and acquaintance with Borusewicz and Walesa. Graduating in 1980 in history at Gdansk University, I managed [there] also to found the NZS [Independent Association of Students] with some friends. Then there was the Solidarity adventure, underground, and the second circulation [samizdat]. Professionally, I am a teacher, a publisher, and a journalist, but during martial law I also sold rolls; being a mountain climber, I painted chimneys; and I organized beachheads of private business. Now, I am formally the assistant editor in chief of the GDANSK GAZETTE. On the other hand, since the Congress has evolved from a society of interesting people to a party, I try to learn and become—though this may still look like buffoonery in Poland—a professional politician.

[Henzler] Is the KLD the ruling party?

[Tusk] No. We became involved in governing because Bielecki, a liberal, became prime minister. But how did this happen? In August of last year, we were received by Walesa to confirm what he had heard: that we were a group of people who can think in economic and legal-systemic categories. Our expert preparation made an impression on the people of Solidarity. We had also already been noticed on the Gdansk political arena. Walesa and the whole propresident movement of the time—in other words, mainly the Center Accord [PC]—valued the fact that liberals were seen as a grouping with not only pretty good intellectual preparation, but also a rather elegant style of political thought. I am repeating here outside opinions; at the time it was essential to break the image of Walesa and his camp created by his opponents. In Walesa's eyes, Bielecki had all the attributes which a president expects from a prime minister. He was not the leader of an excessively strong political movement who could then, annoyingly, emancipate himself; he knows economics; he is a person about whom it was known beforehand that he would win the good will of society, because that's the way he is. Besides this, he was from Gdansk; was a member of parliament with a Solidarity pedigree; had, moreover, good relations with Kaczynski, and with the leaders of the Gdansk Solidarity; and also already had a fair amount of respect in foreign economic circles.

[Henzler] But the good relations with Kaczynski ended rather quickly; the formal divorce with the PC was in March.

[Tusk] For insiders, it was clear that these were two separate political groups that after Walesa's election would have to diverge. At the beginning, the PC was convened as a pastiche of various organizations united to achieve the so-called presidential acceleration. The organizational separation of the liberals and the PC does not, however, signify a conflict between us, or between the prime minister and the chief of staff. On the contrary, the PC remains the only party apart from the Congress which is unambiguously procapitalist. Both groupings are constructed on the same system of values; both aim at a presidential system of government, which may be today the chief differentiator on the political arena. We exhibit, however, a different style of activity.

[Henzler] Already in January of this year, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the PC, emphasized in a conversation with POLITYKA that the Bielecki government acts on the orders of the Gdansk liberals, even though members of the PC also received portfolios in that government. He also criticized the excessive number of Gdanskians in the capital. The break appeared rather early.

[Tusk] January, the month of the formation of the government, was a rather substantial breach. The construction of the cabinet did not run according to the ideas of the PC's leaders. Bielecki tried to minimize the influence of political parties on the shape of the cabinet. When candidates were evaluated, their party origin was in last place, though it was also clear that communists would not be taken into the government. The antipathy toward the interparty contract irritated people from the PC. They were of the opinion that [the PC] was the main force that built the new political structure, including Walesa's presidency. They felt betrayed by the fact that this was not reflected in the cabinet composition. They interpreted the excess of liberals in the government as the greed of the Congress and Bielecki.

[Henzler] A year ago, the liberals still maintained that they would not try to expand the party's ranks—that they would be an electoral party. Now you eagerly inform [us] that the number of your members has already grown from 600 to 2,500-3,000, and that new regional sections are continually forming, etc. Does the rivalry with the PC for influence induce you to develop your own structures? You are forming a youth affiliation incorporating the NZS [Independent Association of (University) Students]; you are allying with the liberal fraction in the SD [Democratic Party]; you smile toward the Republican Party, and so forth.

[Tusk] The Congress, like other parties, began the new year from a very low level; we had several hundred members, practically without an organizational apparatus. From today's perspective, one can thus speak of rapid development, but not of the establishment of a mass party. For us, it was important that liberalism in Poland find itself in such a political formation that would foster effective rivalry for influence. It matters to us, therefore, that we take advantage of the popularity of

the Congress. But I would not mistake this for a popularity of liberalism in Poland. This is not the time of liberals; our position does not signify universal acceptance of our ideas. On the contrary: I perceive a great threat to freedom, which was won with such difficulty. People are not inclined to value freedom for its sake alone; the situation in which everything, or a great deal, depends on them begins to tire them. Freedom has a Polish taste; giving everyone great chances, it poses great demands at the same time. In Poland, we have a situation similar to that which Tocqueville described: People accomplished a revolution because they hated the tyrant, and that is not the same thing as a love of liberty. And the people can come out against freedom, if it does not bring prosperity and safety. And there is no such promise. But it is true that, thanks to a freak accident of history, a system has arisen which promotes our party, and we are trying to take advantage of this.

[Henzler] Why do you describe it as a freak accident of history?

[Tusk] If, according to the colloquial consciousness, Poland has been ruled by the liberals for half a year, then there is an exceptional paradox here, for this is happening in a country where an overwhelming percentage of property still belongs to the state; I see the state, or statist, mentality, [to be dominant] in even worse proportions. The institutions to which liberals attach the greatest weight do not enjoy prestige, or are of poor quality. I am thinking here of, for example, the system of law. And the proportions are strange: A 2,000-member party supplies the prime minister and several ministers.

[Henzler] If, in your opinion, things are so bad, then why did the liberals from the Gdansk playing field decide to play the match of their lives before the whole country?

[Tusk] This is also rather a misunderstanding; the liberals did not decide on this, Bielecki decided. He took upon himself the thankless task of leading the country to free elections. The liberals are the last upon whom one could fix the blame for moving the election date. If Bielecki was playing the polls, as, after all, some of our members wanted, then he would have resigned in May, when the KLD had 20-percent support, and he himself, with 60 percent, beat all other political figures.

[Henzler] Why didn't he do it?

[Tusk] Because he became prime minister not on behalf of the liberals, and not as a liberal, but as an expert employed by the president for a certain mission. And beyond that, liberals have what may be today an old-fashioned flaw: They are responsible for what they undertake. And thus the time is extended for the liberals, though we are aware that now, in popularity studies, we are falling head over heels.

[Henzler] Exactly. Aren't you afraid of losing the political capital that the Congress gained in the first months of Prime Minister Bielecki's government? Aren't you afraid of flat-out discrediting of the ideas of liberalism?

[Tusk] This is our greatest dilemma, and one which cannot be resolved. Most of all I am afraid that people will equate what is happening in Poland today with liberalism or capitalism. Today, the ideas of liberalism can be discredited in a confrontation with the present reality. I think that the task of liberals, or the KLD, is not to rule Poland, but rather to be present in those places where liberals' knowledge and way of thinking can be of use—and thus certainly in parliament, where the legislative process takes place. We would like to be in the future government; we can be, but we do not have to be. Government is not our goal—so we are thus a peculiar party—but I do not see the success of the transformation without the participation of liberals in government.

[Henzler] In your last bulletin, you compare yourselves with the German FDP [Free Democratic Party]. Would you like your leaders to play a similar role in Poland to that of Genscher or Lambsdorf in Germany?

[Tusk] That is really only one of the dreams for the future. The FRG has the luxury in that only three formations, for practical purposes, constitute the entire political arena. We, of course, have Kaczynski's PC, Mazowiecki's Democratic Union, and the liberals, but together they are maybe 40 percent of the seats in the future parliament. And all the rest is that which in civilized Europe is not essential politically. We've got communists, postcommunists, Tyminski's people, peasants, nationalists, etc. Therefore it would be good if the liberals retained their position in economic institutions, like chambers of commerce, employer associations, etc. There are many liberal-minded people in Poland; many do not know that they speak the liberal language. But on the other hand, there are still great antiprivatization and anticapitalist forces in Poland. They will make themselves heard many times yet. Presently, practically everyone is for privatization, the free market, and even capitalism, verbally, but when one begins to analyze intentions, people turn out to be full-fledged socialists. We know that the liberal orthodoxy cannot be applied in Poland. The pragmatism—called opportunism by "pure" liberals—that is often ascribed to us consists simply in applying liberal prescriptions with feeling, and eliminating the risk of demolition of the whole project. There is no art in describing the ideal state, or in citing the holy tenets; rather, [one must try to] change reality—and in conditions which do not encourage reformers. This conviction brings us very much closer to the president.

[Henzler] Do you believe that it is necessary to privatize everything? In many countries with capitalist economies, firms or entire branches of industry that are state property operate excellently.

[Tusk] When the Reagan conservative revolution began in America, someone came up with the idea of privatizing prisons. Despite appearances, this turned out to be an excellent idea, because the prisoners were better off, the state spent less, and someone also made a profit off of it. Here, someone wanted to do this not long ago, but

did not get permission, because Poland is still a country of permission and licenses, and, furthermore, of bribes and stomach ulcers for people who want to do something. Experience teaches that everything that can be privatized should be private. Only organizational or strategic limitations justify state property. The greater the degree of privatization, the greater the economic effects. For us, this is a truism.

[Henzler] What would be the mechanism of attaining full privatization?

[Tusk] I'm not a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Economics...

[Henzler] But after all, your activists are the creators of, for example, the idea of privatization coupons. Instead of five or even 15 minutes for the liberals, as was said at the beginning, you have gotten a half a year already, and still no sign of privatization.

[Tusk] From what I know, we are on the eve of universal privatization. Let us not forget, however, that liberals are not only economists. We are always conscious of the fact that private property is a foundation of freedom, but not the only one. At all my meetings I explain that economic reform is an element of our program. We have also drawn up a program of regionalization; we recognize the necessity of building a system of guarantees of our independence, based upon the Western system of security. These are great programmatic challenges for us, but we have never been afraid of substantive competition.

[Henzler] You are a member of the Gdansk "family," which, as soon as it descended on Warsaw, began to fracture. What influence do the president and his staff have on the Congress today?

[Tusk] The split in the political camp of Solidarity, which has occurred across the country, can be found among us, too, except that Gdansk is different because we never had unseemly conflicts. Thus the Gdansk group is still together and friendly, though we often think differently in politics. As far as the president is concerned, his influence on the government is not transferred to the Congress, though some point to us as the political grouping most loyal to the president. As a rule, there are no formal contacts between the Congress and the Presidential Staff. There are, however, friendships and affinities.

[Henzler] The Congress as a group is criticized for what the prime minister and the government do. How has Prime Minister Bielecki measured up for his party colleagues?

[Tusk] He is not enough a liberal. I think that the era of the Bielecki government will not be remembered by private businessmen as a time of promotion of private enterprise. There are many reasons: old laws; Balcerowicz's policies; tax or tariff policies; many communist-era leftovers, which Bielecki has not yet changed. I am thinking here, for example, of the banks and their

unclear credit policy. The fact that the banks are still run by people who are not from Solidarity has not only ideological implications, but practical ones as well. I have already heard thousands of complaints from private businessmen, who saw in the Congress and Bielecki a chance that someone from outside of the old network could get, for example, cheap hard currency credit. Meanwhile, credit preferences have been clearly cliquish, if not directly political. Not to mention ordinary swindles and corruption, which is characteristic of [a world of] commands, control, and bureaucratic omnipotence.

[Henzler] You are aware that this is a serious charge.

[Tusk] Yes, but I know dozens of such examples. Moreover, Bielecki has been prime minister for half a year already, the liberals have some voice in this country, and private businessmen tell us that they have no idea where the money from the West for the development of private enterprise is. Where are the promised so-called small lines of credit for small firms?

[Henzler] And this is also blocked by the old banking nomenklatura?

[Tusk] I would not want to determine that, but this is happening in a time when a liberal is prime minister. We did not expect such a ghostly resistance from the stuff of the economy itself. On the other hand, I ask my opponents about a better alternative. I am convinced that there is no liberal alternative to Bielecki and the Congress. The alternative is the Left, and I always argue, better Gdansk liberals contaminated with pragmatism, and a Bielecki who is not always faithful to principles, than socialists.

[Henzler] What strategy will the Congress employ in the parliamentary election? Will it compete alone, or in a coalition with the Solidarity camp, if such a thing can be patched together?

[Tusk] We want to compete alone. I am a moderate optimist, and evaluate our chances today at 10 percent of the seats. Liberals are also skeptics, and we are aware that the future parliament will not be the crucial locus of power. Therefore, in the so-called transitional period, we are for a strong presidential government. Strong means effective. What I accuse the government of is the lack of the will to rule. And when power is not used, it rusts and falls apart. Liberals probably found themselves in power too early.

[Henzler] What would you like to offer those several million people who would give you their votes?

[Tusk] Several million people already work in the private sector, and many more want to work in it; these are the ones on whom we count. But we do not want to reveal the details of our electoral campaign prematurely. I am counting on the Congress's electorate being those people of whom Kisiel wrote during the presidential campaign that, if the intelligentsia will vote for Mazowiecki, then

the intelligent people will vote for Walesa. For intelligent people, the Congress should be a party which is ideologically and programmatically legible, a party of the future that does not immerse itself in secondary, historical, or metaphysical disputes.

[Henzler] Exactly. The [average] citizen first sees the liberal prime minister crossing himself during a Mass, then another time sees the prime minister saying publicly of the primate, "Mr. Primate."

[Tusk] That was just a misstatement. In this country no one, not even a communist, would not dare to speak of the primate in this way.

[Henzler] Nonetheless, that misstatement was shown on television, though it was not a live transmission.

[Tusk] Of course, but I will also say that the joy of the anticlerical SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] and of part of the UD [Democratic Union] over the fact that the prime minister said "Mr. Primate" is for me as disturbing as the clericalism of the ZChN [Christian-National Union]. It is a similar phenomenon. And in the form used by certain political groups, it is simply dangerous, because a battle with the church must, in this country, have bad consequences. It would be bad if the liberals were seen as an element of the antichurch front. For liberals, the use of issues of faith in political battles is simply unproductive. The utilization of that problematic issue in any direction is morally ambiguous.

[Henzler] Has the Congress leadership paid a visit to Primate Glemp yet, or asked for such a visit?

[Tusk] It has not, nor has it tried. This may seem strange, but we have not visited the primate, nor the president, nor even the previous prime minister. This is not, however, a statement. Quite simply, the liberals do not feel the need to authenticate their program through visits with authorities. It seems to some politicians that reception by the primate or president raises the political rank of their group. Secondly, there have not been any intentions from the other side. The fact that Bielecki is the prime minister and takes care of many of those official contacts, whether with the primate or the president, during working breakfasts surely makes our lives easier.

[Henzler] What is your attitude toward the old nomenclatura and to the idea of decommunization?

[Tusk] Liberals feel themselves to be the purest contradiction to communism. And though my peers, thirty-five-year-olds, dominate in the KLD, we have had enough experience to sincerely hate communism. I understand decommunization as a deconstruction of the institutions of the old system. This is categorically necessary; however, I regard zealous decommunizers, calling for a settling of accounts, with sceptic attention. It is obvious that it is necessary to hunt the criminals, condemn abuses. Yet the people of the former regime most obviously feel they have gotten away with it, and often use the old networks and the resources they have

hoarded with a lot of cheek. The law must be more effective in eliminating such irregularities. If not the law but the anger of the people brings about a settling of accounts, the fault will lie in large part with the former nomenclatura.

[Henzler] Can former members of the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party] join the KLD?

[Tusk] There have been such cases. But fortunately there is no mass rush. In general, these are people for whom the break with the PZPR came on December 13.

[Henzler] Don't you feel in Poland a little like missionaries?

[Tusk] We don't feel we have a mission; we regard ourselves normally. Most of us, after giving up our government positions, have somewhere to return.

[Henzler] Thank you for this conversation.

Government Dismisses Various Officials

LD2307210891 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 2030 GMT 23 Jul 91

[No video available]

[Text] The chairman of the Council of Ministers has recalled Zdzislaw Miedziarek from his post as secretary of state in the Ministry of Industry; Jozef Lochowski, Franciszek Gajik, and Jerzy Modrzewski from their posts as under secretaries of state; Krzysztof Szewczak from his post as director general; and Janusz Padlowski from his post as plenipotentiary in the Ministry for Cooperation with Trade Unions and Self-Management Organizations.

Party Views on Personalization of Elections

91EP0573B Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 20 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by Piotr Skwiecinski: "Personalization of Elections—In Whose Interest?"]

[Text] The most important point of dispute on electoral law is the question of so-called personalization of elections. Should the voter be obliged to indicate on the ballot opposite the name of the party for which he votes the name of the candidate from this party whom he prefers, which is what the majority of members of parliament would like? Or, as the president believes and as is the practice of most Western democracies, should the electoral act pertain only to specific parties? With personalization, the likelihood of obtaining a mandate would then depend on the position of a given candidate on the ballot. The order of names placed on the ballot would depend entirely on the decision of the party. The voters would not be able to change the ballot.

Supporters and opponents of both concepts cite many arguments intended to form a basis for adopting one or

the other type of elections. Opponents of personalization, therefore, say that the personalization of voting would weaken the political parties being created. It would foster competition among candidates of one faction. Its effect would be little solidarity among the deputies clubs formed in the new Sejm, and the consequence of that would be great political divisions in parliament. The leader of Center Accord, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, spoke of a Sejm composed of 460 autonomous deputies.

Others, Professor Bronislaw Geremek for example, say that the majority of the public demands personalization of elections. They argue that the political parties are far from popular. The voters refuse to think in categories of factions. They want to make a choice among specific persons endowed with authority.

There is no denying the logic of the arguments of both sides. But this does not free us from trying to answer the question of whose interests are served by the one form of electoral law or the other.

Known Names

If the voter will have to place an "X" by the name of a specific candidate, he will have to read the ballot presented to him. Obviously, those groups will be in a better position in which there are more people with known names.

Therefore, most observers would say that the beneficiary of personalization of elections would be the Democratic Union. This is the group with the most vocal politicians and people of culture. Personalization will probably also benefit the Liberal-Democratic Congress and the NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity. Both Solidarity and Bielecki's party have local leaders whose names are familiar to the public in specific electoral districts.

It seems that the other leaders, except for the Center Accord of the Christian Democratic Party, evaluate their election prospects similarly. The leaders of these groups played a significant role in persuading most of the Constitutional Commission to the idea of personalization. In the Great Poland area, this party has a relatively large number of members of the Citizens Parliamentary Club in the present Sejm, and they are therefore well known to the voters.

Personalization would work against Center Accord. Activists of this party were recruited from the second rank of the former Solidarity and their names have not yet penetrated public consciousness.

Personalization is not beneficial to the X Party either. Tyminski's faction has literally not obtained any local or countrywide mandates. In December 1990, its leader managed to garner the votes of a quarter of the Poles. Personalization may, however, work to destroy this

trump card. The voter will be convinced that the list of X Party candidates contains names that are not known or are controversial.

From these points of view, personalization seems to strike at the post-Communist left. Its Poland-wide leaders (Cimoszewicz, Kwasniewski) are able to market themselves well and play the role of driving forces of the leftist bloc. But they have no one suitable for the middle and lower rungs of the party machine.

Paradoxically, the post-Communist deputies spoke decidedly for personalization of elections. I believe that leftist leaders reached the conclusion that personalization will hurt the post-Communist camp, but to a much lesser degree than it will adversely affect the Solidarity groupings. The party apparatus of these young factions is very weak, and political discipline among their activists is at a low level. For this reason, we may expect that the internal struggle among the candidates generated by personalization will be most destructive for the groups derived from Solidarity.

In my opinion, the most important reason for decided support for personalization of elections by the post-Communists is something else however. Leaders of this camp are effectively moving toward sharpening the conflict between the parliament and the president. They seem to be building their political hopes on this conflict.

Coalitions

Personalization of elections will, in a fundamental way, impede the formation of coalitions. Coalitions must be based on interparty agreements on the division of jointly won mandates. If anticipated decisions of the voters can disrupt the carefully prepared combinations, then the rationale for alliances becomes a question mark.

A faction that needs coalition least seems to be the Democratic Union. Public opinion polls indicate that it has the highest and most stable electorate.

The interests of the Democratic Union lie in impeding the formation of coalitions by other groups sentenced by political forces to forming coalitions. I believe that this is still another reason for the Union leaders to prefer personalization of elections.

It must be noted that the considerations presented here are largely hypothetical. The Polish reality is not predictable. No one really knows what the reactions of the voters will be. Neither do the politicians who are fighting over the form of the electoral law know this.

Nevertheless, it seems that the reasons for which the specific political parties take one position and not another with respect to the problem of personalization of elections are, on the whole, the ones presented here. Politics is not an encounter of values. To an ever greater degree, it is a battle of interests.

Party Leader Claims Undue Jewish Control

91EP0598A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
4 Jul 91 pp 14, 15

[Interview with Boleslaw Tejkowski, chairman of the National Party, by Jacek Hugo-Bader at party headquarters; date not given: "There Are Jews Everywhere"]

[Text] Several Warsaw University students told me last month about a girl's being attacked. A group of skinheads gashed her face with razor blades. She lost her sight and was disfigured, all because to them she looked like a Jew. It seems that the skinheads were connected to Boleslaw Tejkowski's Polish National Community of the Polish National Party (that is its full name). According to its chairman, people come to the party in search of "organizational order." "Anyone who looks like a Jew is a Jew, and whoever looks like a horse is a horse," Chairman Tejkowski said at a lecture for party members and sympathizers.

The lecture was held at party headquarters in Warsaw, at 62 Hoza Street. The participants in the discussion called the chairman a wise man, a genius, and Napoleon. After the lecture, I asked Boleslaw Tejkowski for an interview. He eagerly accepted. We talked for several hours on Hoza Street, in the ascetically furnished office. The chairman authorized the interview on 6 June.

In the Kremlin and in the White House

[Hugo-Bader] You returned from abroad.

[Tejkowski] For the third time, we were delegates at the congress of nationalist parties of Russia. The cooperation comes as their idea. They are looking for allies, because they fear the same thing we do, that foreign capital will buy up our national assets and dominate us. We also entered into contact with Czechoslovakia's nationalist movement and with the French La Pena party. We are looking for safe allies, which the Germans will never be, because they are always trying to dominate Poland at all costs.

The nations of the Soviet Union were and are a Soviet Jew colony governed for the most part by the Jews. The Jew Gorbachev, seen as an enemy of the Russians, is a follower of the Anglo Saxons and their lackeys. Before, actually, our misery was also the work of Russian imperialism, but with German agents playing a strong role. Czarina Catherine was a German. After the downfall of the Czardom*** Russia and then Poland became the victims of Jewish communism. Now they are threatened by foreign capital, mainly Jewish and German capital. This is why Russia today can be Poland's best ally.

[Hugo-Bader] The Polish National Party's summons of 20 April says: "Only an alliance with nearby Slavic countries that have great economic and military power can assure Poland's security and development." That part about the "power" is probably said in jest.

[Tejkowski] I am talking about potential, which is great in Russia. It would develop, were it not for the subversion of the Kremlin, which has been subjected to the dictatorship of Jewish, German, and American capital.

[Hugo-Bader] Another appeal on 20 April says: "In the name of an alliance between Poland and Russia, to save these countries from Jewish-American-German domination, we entreat to the Russian and Soviet officials to settle Poles in the Kaliningrad (Krolewicki) district and to consider the possibility of turning it over to Poland." And what if, on behalf of the same alliance, they ask us to give back part of Eastern Prussia?

[Tejkowski] The most important thing is not to let the Germans in there. The question of Kaliningrad must be resolved between the Poles and the Russians. I think that the solution will come out in favor of the Poles.

[Hugo-Bader] In your publication MYSL NARODOWA POLSKA [Polish National Thought] you write that Walesa promised Bush that he would give Silesia and Pommerania back to Germany.

[Tejkowski] The Germans are buying up the companies and state farms. They are throwing the Poles out and settling Germans in their place. Through diplomatic channels we have been learning that the Germans consider it possible to buy up the entire Polish economy. Walesa's policy is serving this very end.

[Hugo-Bader] Here is an excerpt from a letter from your party to President Saddam Husayn: "We are sending you our regards to the Iraqi nation and to you as its leader. We congratulate you on your moral and political victory over the Jewish and American aggression." It seemed to me that Iraq had attacked Kuwait.

[Tejkowski] In 1947, the Anglo Saxons gave Iraq only part of their coast. The rest went to form Kuwait, an artificial creation under U.S. protection, with Jews and crypto-Jews settled there. On the other hand, the way the Americans conducted the war exceeded the Nazi's military actions in their cruelty. They murdered 150,000 Iraqis, mainly civilians. That is a crime, homicide.

[Hugo-Bader] You are warmly received at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Do you like such a regime?

[Tejkowski] We support North Korea in its nationalist attempt towards unification with South Korea and the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. China and Korea have their own special, local, national regimes. On the other hand, this treacherous Jewish communism created through the intermediary of the Soviet Union and America, that is, Yalta and America, is being rejected today, because it does not fit the concept of a united capitalist Europe. Its task was to murder the national elite groups and take over the assets. There was no Autumn of the People. The Soviet Army under

duress—it would never willingly withdraw—was recalled by the Soviet and American governments in agreement with one another.

[Hugo-Bader] That means that there is some sort of supergovernment?

[Tejkowski] Yes. This is a world consultative Jewish government, consistent with the concept of the world's being ruled by a single power, the United States.

At Belweder

[Hugo-Bader] Walesa was in Israel.

[Tejkowski] The visit was a scandal. How can you apologize to the Jews and ask for forgiveness? The Jews must be considered to be our occupiers. They must in no event be given back their property or be permitted to settle in Poland, as the leadership is planning. We have information that they are worming their way into the Krakow archives. They are looking for their property. They want to buy up whole villages.

[Hugo-Bader] Kazimierz in the Krakow region, for example, has always been theirs.

[Tejkowski] If it is standing on the soil of the Poles, then it is their property. In our country only a citizen of Poland without dual citizenship can own property.

[Hugo-Bader] So if the Japanese, for example, wanted to build a computer factory in our country...

[Tejkowski] Japanese brains are more or less the same as Aryan or Polish brains. We should set up such factories ourselves. If the Japanese put them up, then they take the profits from them, but we will be the owners.

[Hugo-Bader] You wrote: "Walesa was brought up in a hermetically sealed circle of solely Jewish civilization." Please decode that.

[Tejkowski] It is widely known that Walesa was acclimated to politics in the Jewish KOR [Committees for the Defense of Labor] circle, which represents an anti-Polish current that has offended the dignity of the Polish nation.

[Hugo-Bader] You published a statement by Anna Walentynowicz showing irrefutably that the president was a communist agent "prepared by the regime for a future role." I can understand a lot of strange things, but, nonetheless, is this not exaggerating?

[Tejkowski] I share Walentynowicz's opinion. To all appearances, they harassed him. To all appearances they mistreated him and locked him up. For this reason, so long as Walesa is in power, the communists will never be brought to trial.

Party X

[Hugo-Bader] What do you think about Tyminski?

[Tejkowski] I do not want to have anything to do with him. He left Poland in 1968. He has citizenship in four different countries. He himself admitted that his wife is a Portuguese Jew.

[Hugo-Bader] But she's Indian. She has a pretty Indian face.

[Tejkowski] Well then she is fortunate to have the original Indian-Jewish beauty. Tyminski surrounded himself with excommunists, people from "Grunwald," appointed by the communist Jew Olszowski. Tyminski comes to us as a modern communist with capital.

[Hugo-Bader] I saw members of your party at a congress of Party X.

[Tejkowski] I know nothing about that.

In the Sejm

[Hugo-Bader] What was the source of your information that deputies Radziwill, Wielowieyski, and Malachowski, names of the oldest families in Poland, were of Jewish heritage?

[Tejkowski] We have the obligation to check nationality. It is harmful to Polish interests to hide it. Statements to the effect that Jews hide their nationality for fear of anti-Semitism are untrue. They want to pass themselves off as Poles and to acquire property as Poles for Jews and advance their interests at the cost of Poles. The Jew Bielecki, who is concealing his origins (for a time), will come to light because of his pro-Jewish actions. We must find out people's nationality. That is absolutely essential. This is best done by running checks on family and neighborhood groups, but it is mainly a matter of analyzing political activity. If Jews put up for office in elections to the Sejm, we are going to make a lot of noise about the fact.

In the Government

[Hugo-Bader] How many signatures did you collect in the presidential elections? What percentage of seats to you think you will get in the next Sejm?

[Tejkowski] I collected 67,124 signatures, and we want to assure ourselves of 10 percent of the votes in the Sejm (50-60 deputies), but we will fight for a majority. We will oppose the notion that the minorities can rule the majority, the way they do now, because the government is mostly Jewish. This is undemocratic and silly, and it is dangerous, too, because the Jews are trying to do away with Poland. They have fiddle-faddled their way to a united Europe without borders, with a free flow of population.

In the Army

[Hugo-Bader] You are asking to "cancel the Polish debt to show the usury and exploitation imposed by Jewish capital." If we decline to replay, we will not be able to buy or sell even a box of matches in the West.

[Tejkowski] And do we need the West so much?

[Hugo-Bader] What sort of aircraft are you going to fly in?

[Tejkowski] Before the war, the Poles built the best aircraft of that time, the Los [Moose].

[Hugo-Bader] But that was a military plane, a bomber.

[Tejkowski] As it turned out. The Americans are making Walesa take down all the arms factories.

[Hugo-Bader] I think that Stalowa Wola is breathing its last breath on its own.

[Tejkowski] That is bankruptcy caused on purpose because they want to sell these plants, the best in Europe, for 10 percent of their value. There is a great world need for arms. Poland used to sell arms. We have wonderful armaments. I am saying this as a military officer.

[Hugo-Bader] When were you in the Army?

[Tejkowski] During the 1970's.

[Hugo-Bader] Is it true that you are planning military service for women?

[Tejkowski] This is to be a year of defense and family training, coming after compulsory secondary education. War can be real, and people need to know how to defend themselves.

[Hugo-Bader] Your appeal to the Army: "We are appealing to the officers and petty officers, who were released from the Polish Army en masse, to organize self-defense." Is this calling for rebellion?

[Tejkowski] The Army should save the country. The army is an organization for external defense, but if the government is antinational and antistate, then this becomes the last argument for saving the country.

[Hugo-Bader] You write that you admit to the party people of various world views and beliefs (including atheists), but then in the next paragraph you say that God is the highest value. How do you reconcile this?

[Tejkowski] People who have not recognized this great, supreme value are reduced to a materialized state. Atheism makes a person lose the spiritual perspective, but patriotism can reconcile us with atheists.

[Hugo-Bader] In *Monte Cassino*, Wankowicz presented several accounts of the marvelous heroic behavior of II Army Corps soldiers of Jewish descent. They have their section in the Polish cemetery at Monte Cassino.

[Tejkowski] That may be. There are only a few such individuals.

[Hugo-Bader] You wrote that the film "Shoah" is pro-German. But is that not exaggerating?

[Tejkowski] The Jews do not talk about the crimes of the Germans. They protect them from accusations. They support the German nation, and they support the German state, but they accuse the Poles of its crime and insist the Poles beg them to be forgiven.

In the Public Health Service

[Hugo-Bader] In your list of "national moral values," you give as item 33: "Undertake your sexual life in a sense of maturity and responsibility, applying natural human values." What is this all about, if I may ask?

[Tejkowski] We do not exalt deviation or contraceptive measures. Sexual relations with contraceptive measures are unnatural and beneath human dignity. People should not make themselves ridiculous or debase themselves. Deviations, like homosexuality, are unnatural and regrettable.

[Hugo-Bader] "These people, Jewish lawyers and physicians, have developed the theory and practice of killing unborn children under the majesty of the law, thereby confirming the worst traditions of ritual murder."

[Tejkowski] This is an excerpt from MYSL NARODOWA POLSKA. As a basis, the author relied on many documents and accounts concerning this issue. Jews alone—politicians, legislators, and physicians—must say their intention in advancing and then carrying out the procedures for murdering unborn children on a mass basis.

In the Church

[Hugo-Bader] Why have you come out against the church? What is the basis for your saying that Glomp, Macharski, many bishops, and a third of the clergy are Jews?

[Tejkowski] Belief in Jesus after all arose in opposition to the belief in Moses. If the Vatican and the bishops were not so dominated by the Jews, such church policy as we have now would not be possible.

[Hugo-Bader] Christ and his mother were Jews.

[Tejkowski] No, Jesus was God incarnate in universal man without nationality. Jesus was taken over to force Christianity into the service of the Jews. These views are being promulgated by the church hierarchy today, led by the Pope. As the bearer of this life, the Mother of God could be of Jewish descent.

[Hugo-Bader] Which means that at Czestochowa Poles are praying to a Jewish woman.

[Tejkowski] This is just what the Jews like to point out. Now, we Poles must pray to God, who alone is worthy of veneration.

In Poland

[Hugo-Bader] Only about 300,000 Polish Jews survived after the war. About 3 million people died. They later

emigrated, some because of anti-Semitic attitudes and the communists' anti-Semitic policy. But some were assimilated, losing their national and cultural roots. How many Jews are there in Poland now?

[Tejkowski] A million and a half or 2 million. They came from the Soviet Union under the auspices of repatriation, passing themselves off as Poles. We want to know their nationality, which should be printed on identity cards.

[Hugo-Bader] What do you propose be done with the Jews?

[Tejkowski] First of all, identify them, and if they represent anti-Polish interests, then they should be given a proposal to leave the country. The United States is the best country for Jews.

[Hugo-Bader] Are there any anti-Semites in Poland?

[Tejkowski] I think that so-called anti-Semitism is justified in Poland. Our historical experience with the Jews has been terrible. First there was the Jews' collaboration during the Swedish invasion, then during the partitions. Later there were the Soviet Jews and then the Jewish UB [Security Administration] internal security forces, and now there are the Solidarity Jews. The nation has a sense of the Jewish threat on both the conscious and unconscious level.

[Hugo-Bader] Who paints swastikas in Umschlagplatz?

[Tejkowski] Probably the Jews, so there will be talk about anti-Semitism. I understand destroying a Jewish symbol, but to paint an inimical one makes no sense. I saw something written on the Jewish Theater: "Jews to the gas chambers." It was probably written by a Jew, to blame the Poles.

[Hugo-Bader] What would you do if it turned out that your grandmother was a Jew?

[Tejkowski] There is no such possibility. My parents are Poles. My father and mother were in the Greater Polish uprising, and only Poles undertook this difficult, honorable task. Would they not be in GAZETA?

[Hugo-Bader] People in your party say that GAZETA WYBORCZA is full of Jews. So how come you agreed to this interview? Maybe on the other hand there are no Jews among us?

[Tejkowski] The fact that it is full of Jews is not important. Politics calls for a cross fire of views. I used GAZETA as a vehicle of information.

[Box, p 15]

From MYSL NARODOWA POLSKA [Polish National Thought], a party publication:

"If the Jews are dangerous, it is because it is easier to destroy than to create. Putrefactive bacteria may be primitive in essence, but they can destroy life."

"The new 'elite groups' made up of Jews and Jewish lackeys are generally uncreative, spoiled, and lazy. Exposed to these 'elite groups,' the masses will soon take on the mangle of decay."

"The monster of a new civilization, the monster of Judaism, will grow up like a black flower of death on the Polish nation, which once was famous for its enlightened civilization."

"Chiefly Jews of various shapes and incarnations have taken over the new moral-training government (referring to catechetics), like a famished locust.... It is a question of depriving us of the essential weapon to fight the Judaism preying on Poles."

[Box, p 15]

The Polish National Community of the Polish National Party appeared in 1988 following the "roundtable." The largest national party in Poland, it has 4,000 members and sympathizers. Chairman Boleslaw Tejkowski was a candidate in the presidential election and claims to have collected 67,124 signatures. It is the most radical among the six national party groups.

The National Party (called "Senior" [Senioralnym]). Chairman Maciej Giertych.

The Szczerbiec National Party came into being in 1989. The chairman is Marian Baranski.

[Box, p 15]

National Democracy came into being in 1990 after breaking away from Szczerbiec.

The National Democrats have been operating in London since 1939, and were the heirs to Roman Dmowski's ND [National Democracy—pre-WW II party, reactivated in 1989]. Antoni Dargas is chairman.

The National Democratic Party was created by Count Jan Zamoyski at the instigation of Dargas. It is the only national party recognized by London. They were given Dmowski's personal effects (his ballpoint pen, for example).

There are several other national parties of local significance. Tejkowski's party is the only one hostile to the church hierarchy.

Reply to Nationalist Leader's Anti-Jewish Tirade

91EP0620A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 10 Jul 91 p 15

[Article by Krzysztof Wolicki in "Opinions" section: "Obscenity: By Publishing the Boleslaw Tejkowski Interview (GAZETA 4 Jul), You Contravened the Standards of Decency Observed in Countries With Democratic Traditions"]

[Text] I met Boleslaw Tejkowski, still Benko at that time, in Krakow in 1956, as an activist of the October student

movement. In the autumn of 1958, when he learned that I had come to Krakow, Tejkowski suggested we meet, and we did so at the Main Market (Główny Rynek) late in the evening. He asked me about the situation in Warsaw circles of the revisionist opposition. Then he told me that it was time now to shift to more decisive action and proposed arranging to assassinate Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz. He and his friends would supply the packages of dynamite and detonators.

This was not my first brush with an attempt to provoke me. I came across as a rather extreme radical, and that was undoubtedly the reason for such attempts. Therefore, immediately after I returned to Warsaw, I warned friends whom Tejkowski sometimes visited, such as Anita and Jerzy Duracz, that they should keep him subdued.

Shortly thereafter the unsuccessful assassin came to Warsaw, where he had been allocated an apartment out of turn, at the recommendation of—Cyrankiewicz. Tejkowski's direct party patron and protector was Comrade Alster, of the Organizational Department of the PZPR's [Polish United Workers Party] Central Committee, who probably thought that he was thereby assuring himself of having an influence on the revisionist youth community. The earlier warnings had unfortunately not reached everyone, at least not until Tejkowski appeared as a witness for the prosecution during the political trials of the 1960's.

At that time Tejkowski also changed his name, along with his announced views and milieu. As a Pan-Slavist, he began to set up secret groups of five people who greeted each other in Old Slavic and wrote using the Cyrillic alphabet.

But I know these excerpts from his biography only secondhand. I did not meet Tejkowski again until August 1982, when I was "parked" in Bialoleka before being transferred to the prison on Rakowiecka Street. They brought Tejkowski in one day as a new intern, but nobody associated with him anymore, and he was soon taken away.

As one can see, Tejkowski need not be just a maniac. It probably makes no sense to try to figure out whether it was the police that developed his mania or whether it was maybe his mania that led him to the police, or finally whether there were ambitions first of all, then frustrations, and later bad associates, and ultimately a "psychiatric departure," serving as the false awareness that had become essential to live. The Jews have saved more than one person from self-abomination.

I can imagine several motives for GAZETA WYBORCZA's publishing the Boleslaw Tejkowski interview on 4 July. The first is the simplest: Impropriety, a departure from the unwritten standard of decency, always stirs the readership, and it certainly is not your fault that impropriety in politics is so horrible. Not everyone is capable of pornography. But a more elegant motive could also be found. For example, Tejkowski

babbles such horrible nonsense that it is enough to let him talk for him to compromise himself.

You will possibly be paid off for the first of these motives in your coffers and conscience, but I will warn you about the second one. Democracy has a well-known dilemma. Freedom must always mean freedom for people of different viewpoints, but it should not mean freedom for enemies of freedom. The practice of countries with established democracies has developed so that, for example, there is an out in the form of "respectability" [in English], "*respectabilite*," and "*Salonfachigkeit*." There is no good Polish translation for this concept, and there is a reason why democracy has not been firmly established in our country.

The English word "respectability" simply means the principle of decency. Whatever is indecent is not persecuted. It is not even prohibited, but it is somehow sidetracked and marginalized, designated to certain social positions. The situation of manners and customs is commonly known. Less attention is paid to the role of the principle of decency in politics. Now, it is just in politics that it is particularly important, and when it begins to find mass violations, then, in a democracy, the alarms go off.

The temptation of indecency is always in operation, of course, which is the reason for the circulation and the ringing cash registers. There is, however, a fundamental difference between incessant private violations of standards and a situation in which the standard itself is overturned. Now, in Poland's situation in 1991, given the depth of the crisis and the disappearance of so many other standards, the norm of decency is also disappearing. When I read in GAZETA WYBORCZA that Tejkowski's group is "the largest national party in Poland" (67,124 signatures) and that it is "the most radical of the six national groups," then what is most offensive is not the use of the superlative but the continuity of the political spectrum presented in the article. What should be said in order [for these views] to fall off the political spectrum?

There does not seem to be much awareness here of the well-known debate over whether arguments cease to be politically effective when they are irrational. Even if Tejkowski were to lose more convinced people than he gained by appearing in our pages, such an accounting would be very shortsighted. What is important is not a gain or loss of 1,000 signatures on his list, but the very fact that the standards were violated, because you allowed them to be. You endowed Boleslaw Tejkowski with that "respectability," and he does not deserve it.

Army Depoliticization, Religious Role Discussed

91EP0600A Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY
in Polish No 28, 14 Jul 91 p 4

[Interview with Bronislaw Komorowski, deputy minister of national defense, by Miroslaw Cielemecki; place and date not given: "Politics in the Shadow of Cannon"]

[Text] [Cielemecki] Is the Polish Army by now apolitical?

[Komorowski] The principle of an apolitical army is acknowledged by an absolute majority of the career military. Formally, though, there is no law imposing such a principle, as yet. The draft legislation concerning professional military service, which is to sanction an apolitical and nonpartisan military, has long since been on the back burner.

[Cielemecki] In the coming parliamentary elections the military electorate will be not unimportant to the contesting political parties.

[Komorowski] The parties are aware of this. So far a majority of the political forces operating in our country has been respecting the principle of an apolitical military. However, in the heat of the electoral contest it will be easy to cross this as yet unwritten boundary line.

At present, as I see it, there exists a paradoxical situation: On the one hand the career military completely approves of the principle of political noninvolvement, and is even showing less and less interest in politics, but on the other, many parties are trying to include problems of the Army and national defense into planks of their electoral programs. This is normal, and in many cases even advantageous to the military. But I am apprehensive, considering that, in a military which on the eve of its reform still displays many shortcomings, certain forces may want to exploit this for a so-called negative electoral campaign. This may obscure the actual picture of the military.

[Cielemecki] I doubt whether the military can be kept completely untouched by politics. After all, it includes members who are subject to normal rules of social behavior.

[Komorowski] Of course, some persons in uniform will always tend to link or identify themselves with various political forces. Unavoidably, some officers prefer certain political options over others. But we merely are propagating the stance of nonparticipation of officers in the activities of any political party. At the same time, we do not want to force them to stay neutral in face of what is happening in the civilian world.

[Cielemecki] Despite the Ministry's attempts to the contrary, some officers continue to take an active part in political activities.

[Komorowski] The military is still affected by its past, when most of the career soldiers used to be members of a single party. To be sure, its party-mindedness had been purely formal, but it did exist. Certain habits have endured.

Another relic of the past is the tradition of groups of dissident officers, which had arisen in the fall of 1989. I am referring to certain officers who had founded embryo Solidarity chapters and various other societies, having the renewal of the Army as a goal. A decision taken by the National Defense Committee in February 1990, even

before I was appointed to my post at the Ministry of National Defense, forbade any further such activities. Some of the officers accepted this decision and ceased to engage in them, while others have been continuing to maintain informal contacts and attempt to influence the direction and pace of changes in the military.

[Cielemecki] The Viritim Association, which recently became public, is included in that category.

[Komorowski] I believe so. I base my opinion on the bylaws of that association, a copy of which has been deposited with the minister of national defense.

[Cielemecki] To what party is Viritim linked?

[Komorowski] I don't know. I can only hypothesize.

[Cielemecki] It is said to be the Center Accord, which believes that its influence on the Ministry's civilian segment is too limited.

[Komorowski] Regardless of what party Viritim is linked to, any such linkage is a bad precedent that violates the principle of an apolitical military and at the same time encourages other political groupings.

[Cielemecki] In the pre-September 1939 Army, to whose tradition the military of the Third Republic increasingly often refers, officers, and especially generals and colonels, were involved in political activity.

[Komorowski] But in general at that time the principle itself of an apolitical military had been respected. To be sure, various associations, including clandestine ones, used to exist and, while their purposes often were constructive, on the whole such activities did not benefit the military. The negative consequences of the excessive involvement of officers in political activities became manifest later in the Polish Armed Forces in the West [during World War II]. This lesson is worth bearing in mind nowadays.

[Cielemecki] Do you trust the present-day generals?

[Komorowski] I would rather not offer any generalization on this issue.

[Cielemecki] To put it differently, do you trust all the generals currently in active service?

[Komorowski] It would be difficult not to trust individuals with whom one desires to collaborate. I am trying to foster in myself and in my civilian associates the idea that the military, such as it exists and as we received it in legacy, is worthy of approbation. This does not mean that we have abandoned the idea of viewing the military critically and desiring to change it. In a word, a system of political control over the military has to exist.

[Cielemecki] The acceptance of the military in public opinion is steadily growing. Recently it has begun to elicit more public trust than the Catholic Church.

[Komorowski] I am gratified to note the greater popularity of the military among the society. But it disturbs me to see that this is not reflected in the thinking of the forces bearing responsibility for the destiny of our country and our national defense. This can be partly attributable to the modest funds budgeted for the military, but only partly.

One of the elements of the legacy of the past has been the belief that the military alone is responsible for national defense. But the political camp currently in power, from which I myself derive, lacks experience and knowledge of defense problems. A system for training civilian personnel in this respect should be established as soon as possible, and not only for the future new Ministry of National Defense at that but also for other structures of the state.

Attributing the growth of public support for the military to internal changes in the military alone would be naive. Some of that support is due to the growing complexity of the domestic and foreign situation. The public approves of those structures that it associates with a feeling of order, security, and stability.

[Cielemecki] In the previous decade the military had reached the peak of public support just before the imposition of martial law.

[Komorowski] True. In addition to extensive propaganda efforts, this was due to the known and still continuing mechanism which I already mentioned, namely, a frustrated and uncertain need of the public for stable structures.

[Cielemecki] Now the level of frustration is again rising, and the state structures are swaying. Might not somebody want to again utilize the Army?

[Komorowski] I am no prophet. I am in favor of distancing the military from political struggles. I believe that the career military also desires this, bearing in mind the experience of years past. The Army really does not want to involve itself in domestic political disputes. I believe that no one can involve it in that way.

[Cielemecki] Do politicians understand this?

[Komorowski] I don't know. At any rate, that was the situation during the presidential campaign. The heads of the Ministry of National Defense are doing everything to keep the Army away from the heat of the [coming parliamentary] elections.

[Cielemecki] But you and other civilians at the Ministry will become involved in that campaign, because, after all, you yourselves are political appointees.

[Komorowski] I dread this very much. Under normal circumstances this would be no sin, because the sense of a civilian-managed Ministry of National Defense also consists in that its civilian heads can be replaced depending on which political party is in power. As for the military heads, these would remain, regardless of

politics, and this would assure stability of the military. The problem is that the Ministry of National Defense has not yet been reformed, and I, together with Janusz Onyszkiewicz, are practically the only civilian executives among all these military. This places us under the unwritten obligation of keeping a distance from political struggles.

[Cielemecki] Even now I already have perceived attempts to involve the military in politicking. Consider for example the dispute between the Presidential Chancellery and the Sejm about the nature of the military's subordination and the composition of the National Security Council.

[Komorowski] It should be clearly stated that nowadays the president is the commander in chief of the military. Ultimately the constitution must elucidate that relationship. The only thing I fear is that the dispute over the constitution and the powers of the government may spill over into the military. That is something that should not happen. Attempts to involve the military in the controversy concerning certain presidential powers are dangerous to the state.

[Cielemecki] You champion the principle of an apolitical military, but at the same time you keep bringing it closer to the Catholic Church—pilgrimages, masses, military chaplains....

[Komorowski] Contrary to our habits, politics and world outlook are two different matters. Field chaplaincy as a military structure is subordinated not to me but to the minister of national defense. Besides, can a single field bishop supervising some 30 aged military chaplains, who besides have other things on their minds as well, result in clericalizing an army of 300,000?

Yet such suspicions exist among the military because, as a legacy of the past, a substantial part of career soldiers are now sensitized to any form of indoctrination. After all, the Holy Father's statement that the military is not a fertile field for pastoral activities makes sense. In the past, religion had been decisive to careers, advancement, and individual destinies. For this reason, the officer corps has evolved in such a manner that nowadays it is, to a greater extent than the general public, either indifferent toward religion or atheistic. I can understand that sensitization.

Certain officers manifest a desire to demonstrate clearly what used to be forbidden, and some of them also attempt to turn attitude toward religion into a springboard for professional advancement. They think that it is worthwhile to show that they are zealous Catholics. I have met gentlemen who expected to become generals on the grounds of being practicing Catholics. I have also been visited by individuals who had clearly suffered in the past for being loyal to their religious beliefs, and more than once I felt helpless, not knowing how to repair the injustice done to them.

I hope that administrative guidance of religious practices is absent in the military. But I am aware that this danger exists.

[Cielemecki] But precisely is not such guidance fostered by the military chaplaincy system?

[Komorowski] Still, the military also means hundreds of thousands of young people doing their basic military service, who, like the general public as a whole, are for the most part Catholics. These young people expect to have military chaplains minister to their religious needs while in the Army. What nowadays in Poland is viewed as clericalization of the Army is something normal in the democratic world. Military chaplaincies in other countries operate on an even much bigger scale than in ours. In the United States, for example, there is at least one chaplain assigned to each battalion and he eats his meals together with the soldiers, sleeps with them in the same room, and drills and does parachute jumps together with them as well.

I believe that in this country, too, following a surge of emotions caused by zeal or reaction to the past, a time for reflection will come, and it will turn out that military chaplaincy is a normal and desirable institution. Of course, in this connection, allowance must be made for ministering to the needs of creeds other than Roman Catholicism and respecting the feelings of the unbelievers. I imagine the following model: The Catholics go confess their problems to a military chaplain while the atheists go to a psychologist.

Dire Financial Status of Shipyards Described

91EP0576A Warsaw RYNNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 74, 20 Jun 91 p 5

[Article by Lechoslaw Stefaniak: "Can the Shipyards Get Out of the Doldrums?"]

[Text] People used to say that the shipbuilding industry was our national specialty. It came to be said that the whole nation was building ships. The shipbuilding branch of industry was thought of very warmly because its exports made it second only to the coal mining industry in contributions to the nation's foreign exchange.

A little over a decade ago, as one of the shipbuilding industry managers of the day put it, "We were scaling the heights of competition." Indeed, Poland was one of the important world producers of fishing boats, "ro-ro" carriers, container ships, and timber carriers. Just about all types of ships were launched at our shipyards. While others produced large tankers of relatively simple design, we built smaller vessels that were technically complicated and loaded with the modern equipment necessary at sea.

Today Polish shipbuilding is in decline, and some of the shipyards are even on the verge of bankruptcy. Our

powerful Eastern partner that once bought three-quarters of our total production has nearly disappeared entirely from the shipbuilding horizon, but we were not able to continue operating under the principles that until recently were used in figuring contracts. Because the dollar-ruble exchange rate was artificially low, and the prices were a far cry from world prices, shipbuilding was unprofitable, and large budget subsidies were required. Moreover, unlike Western shipowners, Soviet shipowners did not make advance payments during the consecutive stages of ship construction. As a result, the shipyards were forced to finance production practically on their own, because they did not receive payment until the construction was complete and the ships were transferred to the owners.

It is not surprising, for example, that the contracts still left and being worked on at the Szczecin shipyard have led it into tremendous debt. The enterprise was forced to use bank credit at crippling interest rates. It was just left holding the bag, because the Soviet shipowners simply do not have the money to either buy a single finished supply ship or finance the construction of any more ships. The Gdansk shipyard has already withdrawn from some of the contracts with the USSR, but it is still left with the last sailing vessel, a school ship with the charming name "Nadziehda" (Hope). The ship is standing at the shore ready to face the elements, but the shipowner, a maritime academy in Vladivostok, does not have the wherewithal to pay for it. Nonetheless, the shipyard people have not lost hope of selling it, if not to the Russians, then to a Western customer. Also at the Gdansk shipyard, a floating dock for the USSR is under construction, but it will probably meet with the same fate. Construction will either be interrupted or completed on behalf of someone else.

The rest of the CEMA agreements are unfavorable to our shipyards, but they are not the sole reason for the crisis. Foreign trade mistakes are also responsible.

Several years ago the monopoly of what was then the Centromor Maritime Import-Export Center was eliminated. A stock company was created with exclusive rights to buy and sell ships and other ship equipment.

At that time the shipbuilders and producers won the right to make transactions independently. It soon became apparent, however, that it was impossible to set up foreign trade offices in every plant, and those offices that were formed proved unable to assure production continuity in the industry. They simply lacked the proper staff, foreign trade experience, reputation—this factor is not unimportant—and the whole efficient network of foreign agencies that Centromor had developed over the years.

This situation led as a result to the dispersal of what at one time had been a uniform sales promotion policy for the whole branch of industry. Things reached the point of paradox. For example, several Polish business people would approach the same foreign partner and begin

outbidding one another, thereby weakening their offers. This created tremendous revenge throughout the industry, but it was the small and mid-sized shipyards that fared the worst, because they were left without hardly any orders at all. In addition, the reputation of one of the largest shipyards, the Gdynia shipyard, was severely damaged, as a result of protracted, mishandled negotiations with Kvaerner, a Norwegian firm, a fiasco that brought into question the shipyard's ability as a producer to fulfill contracts.

These and several other factors were responsible for the fact that our shipyards are operating today at half steam and are building far fewer ships in terms of tonnage and the number of units, although their overall total is higher. In the near future, after 1992, they will simply not have enough orders.

It is a paradox that the industry's production capacities are underutilized, despite the presently favorable conditions on world markets and the influx of Western orders making up for orders from the East. Ryszard Ferworn, chairman of the administration and CEO of Centromor, S.A., says: "It does not seem as though we will have any real problem maintaining ship exports to the West at a level of about 200 million dollars per year. The file of orders is not small either, reaching \$1 billion for the next two or three years. The problem, though, is to see that the shipbuilding industry has the proper conditions for winning contracts. It is simply a matter of guarantees from the industry (through Centromor and the Commercial Bank) to assure foreign partners that the contract will be carried out, or, in the event that the agreement is not carried out, that the deposits will be returned."

This was the very reason that, at Centromor's suggestion, at a recent meeting in Ustka, the managers of the

shipbuilding industry decided to reintegrate this branch of industry by creating a consortium of shipyards and plants that produce equipment to outfit ships. The goal of the consortium would be to step up sales, promotion, and marketing activities, in order to fill the shipyard files with export orders.

Centromor is to play a leading role in this undertaking. It is best prepared to do so. After all, it has a staff that specializes in foreign trade. It has a rather good financial position. And it has not lost its good name yet. It has been working for that good name for 40 years. It must be clearly stated, however, that the consortium would not mean a return to the practices of the former Shipbuilding Industrial Association but would assure full autonomy for all six shipyards and the more than 20 plants that produce equipment.

Furthermore, as representatives from the shipyard branch stated, another institution must be created, a bank associated with Centromor, and it must be able to finance current and future shipbuilding construction. Centromor has always been a clearing institution for the shipyards in the past, but with these new factors in mind, it has already created a special unit that will first of all handle the immediate financial needs of the entire branch and then be transformed into a bank and operate as a separate financial organization.

This therefore seems to be a step in the right direction, not only restoring the Polish shipbuilding industry's good name but also reestablishing trust among its foreign partners, which after all want assurances that the money they put into our shipyards to build ships will be well invested. We too want the assurance that these transactions will also bring benefits to us, because this is ultimately what commerce is all about.

Government Seen Ignoring Fascist Danger

91BA0909C Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 5 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by Octavian Paler: "At Least That"]

[Text] At the core of the crisis of authority that is eroding and sapping the public authority is a crisis of trust. In turn, the crisis of trust reflects the crisis of legitimacy of the government. In a way, the regime is now itself reaping the poisoned fruit of some of the tactics by which, consciously or unconsciously, it infected the entire society with the pus that should have been cleaned out of the totalitarian abscess. Recently, however, I am more and more afraid that the regime is only now preparing the worst for us yet (or risking to prepare it) because of its weaknesses, complicities, complexes, and cowardices revealed by its equivocal attitude toward extremist currents. These currents, which entered the arena with jarring aggressiveness and indecency, sometimes make me wonder whether we may not have arrived in the same situation as Germany in 1930. After all, what makes us any different? Our society is demoralized and feels frustrated, just like the German society at the time. Poverty and unemployment are baring their fangs. The absence of hope is becoming increasingly difficult to bear. Xenophobia is poisoning even the more rational spirits. Chauvinism threatens to become a drug and so does anti-Semitism. We are all of us tired, irritable, at times exasperated. What will happen? we wonder. In the meantime, danger is brewing both on the extreme left and the extreme right, a danger that, as it is becoming increasingly clear, we have no right to dismiss. Because the danger that fascism and communism, either the one, or the other, or both of these catastrophes that ravaged our century, may come back to life in this corner of Europe, this time not as imported catastrophes, is not at all imaginary. And what is the regime doing in the face of this possible nightmare? It is doing what it always does. Defending its seats instead of defending the country and our chances of achieving a normal civilization. It is weaving a web of repressive laws against those who challenge it, while at the same time creating all the conditions for an orgy of extremist demagoguery, because it seems to fear the democratic opposition more than it does the flourishing trafficking in fascist and communist slogans. It flatters aggressiveness in order not to provoke it against itself, it shuts its eyes to the threats, and every once in a while it voices some timid accusation with an apologetic air, something that in fact does nothing but stimulate the temerity and lack of manners of extremism of every color.

Some may tell me that the regime is scared, too. I believe that. It has every reason to be scared. It seems that now the extremists no longer need encouraging signals from Mr. Roman like in Alba Iulia. They can manage by themselves. And I would not be surprised if one day Mr. Roman himself did not have to suffer the jeering of those he encouraged to jeer on our national anniversary, or if Mr. Iliescu were not treated ungratefully by those he

saved from reproach while he was settling accounts with the mere memory of University Square. But the fact of its own fear does not absolve the regime of its responsibility, because it "inherited" the extremism thanks to at least three of the means it used to promote its purposes.

First, it a priori torpedoed the prospects of a real democracy in our country. Seemingly from the first moment, obsessed by the fear (a leftover syndrome from 1946) that the historical parties will sweep it away from the political stage, the regime used every tool it had seized thanks to the revolution against those parties, in its determination to discredit them and to block their way to the government. With a myopic selfishness it succeeded, on the one hand, in surrounding itself with a political semiwilderness—in which there could clearly be no peace—and on the other hand, to bring the Romanian society, torn as it was and made hysterical by these maneuvers, to the point where it became increasingly difficult to govern. It probably did not for a moment think that the precariousness of the democracy would suit the extremists wonderfully. Second, the regime betrayed its promise to devote itself to national reconciliation. Instead of trying to drain the hatred bequeathed by all that preceded it, it whipped it up to the point of delirium and, with irresponsible cynicism, it parlayed it into a political weapon without considering that hatred begets monsters. Moreover, by smearing its opponents instead of responding with arguments, it paved the way for the vile, the slanderers, and the violent language that the extremists are currently using without restraint. The road traveled by the regime since December 1989 has been a long string of instigations, hostilities, and discord more than once pushed to the brink of fratricidal war. And now the consequences are showing. Sick, traumatized, and disoriented, the Romanian society looks like a broken vessel. These are ideal conditions for extreme right or extreme left demagogues! Finally, the regime has on its conscience the current chaos and uncertainty that fray our nerves and that have led some to regret, God help us, the totalitarian order, or to wish for a military dictatorship. We have come to the point where Romanians feel nostalgic about police-controlled prices and planned squalor. Are all these things not heaven-sent for the extremists? All they have to do now is to add fuel to the fire, make the atmosphere a bit more toxic, play national sentiments like a trump card, and further poison the spirits in the expectation that the disasters will work in their favor.

I fear that the current regime can no longer help us recover our wits, find each other, and together regain the solidarity we need. Too many wounds have been opened within a short span and too much blood was shed after the revolution to permit a light-hearted inventory taking. Nevertheless, it is important that the regime not complete the evil done so far. At least that. It has brought us to the brink of disaster, but it may still refrain from pushing us into it. Why should it not muster the same energy against extremism as it did in its attempt to "crush" the democratic parties? Does it not realize the

threat looming over us? Does it not dare to fight it? Or does it indeed fear democracy more than anything else?

Supreme Court Judge Involved in Political Trial

91BA0896B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 4 Jul 91 pp 1, 5

[Article by Sorin Rosca Stanescu: "Who Else Is on the Supreme Court?"]

[Text] We have received a letter from Radu Negrescu, who is in France, from which we quote: "I have read with great interest the article about the 'Eleven New Judges Nominated to the Supreme Court' published in your 19 April 1991 issue. I was not at all surprised to learn that Liviu Giurgiu was also among the judges nominated by Ion Iliescu. It was stated in the Senate that he never participated in any political process, and that he did not collaborate with the Securitate. I will ask Mr. Giurgiu: 'What were you doing on 5 July 1977, unless someone with your name and of about the same age was performing the infamous functions of the Communist-Securitate judicial branch during that period? In case you do not remember, which I am sure must be the case given the number and speed of the type of trials over which you were presiding, I can refresh your memory by inviting you to look up file No. 5636 of the Bucharest Sector 7 Court, dated 5 July 1977. I should inform you that I also have a copy of this file, and that I intend to make it public through the press. I also want to inform you that with the publication of this letter I once more consider my life in danger, as I did 14 years ago, and that my attorney as well as the French Police have already been advised of that. I did not have an opportunity to see you again after I was released from the Danube-Black Sea Canal, but I hope that we will meet at the trial of the suit which I intend to file so that I can ask you: how is your conscience doing?'"

Liviu Giurgiu is indeed a Supreme Court judge nominated by Ion Iliescu. What remains to be seen is whether he is the one and the same who in 1977, under orders from the Securitate, sentenced a political dissident to prison; and of course, whether the trial was in fact of a political nature. We naturally contacted Mr. Giurgiu: He confirmed that he was the judge in the case of our letter writer, but he denied that the trial was a political one and that he followed the orders of the Securitate. "I can't offer you any further details," he added. Under the circumstances, I was forced to obtain these...details by myself; and here is what I found out. The Negrescu case is associated with a memorandum addressed to Senator Henry Jackson, in Washington, signed by seven Romanian citizens protesting against the brutal violations of human rights by the Communist regime. This was in 1977.

The memorandum states that Ion Marinescu, worker, Radu Negrescu, Iosif Nita, Nicolae Windis, and Raymond Paunescu, civil servants, Vasile Constantinescu, engineer, and Dragos Neamtu, designer, were arrested by

the Securitate, tortured, tried behind closed doors and without defense counsel, and condemned to one year of hard labor at the modern version of the Danube-Black Sea Canal. These men had gone on a hunger strike to protest against the policies conducted by the Communist government, and against their violation of fundamental human rights.

Before that, they addressed an open letter to Nicolae Ceausescu and went on the hunger strike. What happened next? The Militia surrounded the building in which the seven young men were staying—Bl G 6 of Str. Compozitorilor, No. 5, in Bucharest—posted guards on the roof and in the corridor of the floor of Apt. 56, and closed the street. The people of Bucharest must surely remember this incident, news of which rapidly spread by word of mouth. After more than 24 hours, the Securitate broke down the door and evacuated the strikers in front of a crowd of curious people. At the time, the case was reported by Free Europe and by the publications DIE WELT VOCHE and THE OBSERVER. We are making available to Mr. Giurgiu and to Mr. Iliescu, who nominated him for Supreme Court justice, copies of all the articles published throughout the world, as well as the interventions of Amnesty International referring to this case. We do agree: Press reports, no matter how prestigious the publications, do not constitute legal proof, no more than the thorough investigations of Amnesty International. On the other hand, Civilian Court Sentence No. 3682, pronounced at the public session of 5 July 1977, is the most conclusive possible proof, implicating Judge Liviu Giurgiu (then at the Bucharest Sector 7 Court) in a political trial. Here is what the transcript says: "The Court, based on evidence No. 5636/1977...on the oral trial, and on file No. 192013/1976 regarding work assignments, finds that Radu Negrescu has expressly refused work assignments and that he has not withdrawn his request to leave the country for ever. For these reasons, in the name of the law, the Court decides: It accepts the evidence introduced in the trial and compels Radu Negrescu to work for one year at a construction project in Constanta County. This sentence is final and executable, and is pronounced at the Session of 5 July 1977." Signed by Liviu Giurgiu.

Guilty or not guilty, the Canal had to be completed. But in order to also get the help of the former strikers of Str. Compozitorilor, they needed the intervention of the Securitate and of the Communist justice. Here is the story of another victim of this event, Dan Iosif Nita: "During the celebrations of 23 August, several political dissidents and I were held under house arrest in Medgidia for three days. After we returned to Bucharest, we started a hunger strike at one of our apartments in Bucharest. This was a political strike. The phone line was cut, the apartment house was surrounded, and guards were posted in and outside the apartment house. The door of the apartment was then smashed and a swarm of civilians and militiamen poured in; the Militia was in the rear. The civilians were armed with rubber truncheons which they began to handle like professionals. They did

their duty for 10 years. Barefoot, undressed, handcuffed, and struck on our backs, we were taken out of the house. Outside, the people looked at us horrified. In front of the apartment house, before being thrown into the van, we were beaten again to show the population how traitors are punished and to discourage anyone from asking for his rights. The 'master of arms' was Major Carnaru, who personally acknowledged that what he knows best is how to administer a beating. And he truly knew how. The 'legal' framework of the raid, conducted without a search warrant, was provided by prosecutor Colonel Birca. The apartment was expertly searched, and the host, Radu Negrescu, was beaten even on his testicles so that he might lose his fondness for a hunger strike and so that he would disclose his anticommunist materials; afterwards, he was photographed surrounded with as much food as possible, so that the report would show that the hunger strike was just a joke. At the Securitate headquarters in Calea Rahovei, we received another beating, after which we were turned over to some well-mannered gentlemen dressed in suits. Toward the evening, with our backs well thrashed, with the pile of declarations obtained from us, once more on a hunger strike because we were fed only water, and handcuffed, we were loaded into two prison vans and placed in the care of Colonel Maxim of Medgidia, who told us through clenched teeth that he would give us all the attention we deserved as soon as we got 'home'."

We will not go on. The story is disturbing, and could fill the pages of a horror novel. Mister Ion Iliescu, here is who you have nominated for the Supreme Court. Mister Liviu Giurgiu, does your conscience trouble you about these events? Basic decency should have prompted you to refuse the kind promotion which the country's president has offered you. Why didn't you? Maybe we will find out.

Defense Council Discusses Flooding, Yugoslavia

*AU2907200691 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1921 GMT 29 Jul 91*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 29/7/1991—Gathered on July 29, 1991 under the chairmanship of Romania's President Ion Iliescu, the Supreme Council for the Defence of the Country analysed the effects of the natural calamities caused by the heavy rainfalls in Romania on July 28 and 29.

To eliminate the effects of the floods commands were set up to help the victims of the disaster which are made up of military, gendarmerie and police troops whose teams are now in the affected areas.

Taking into consideration the amount of the disasters, the members of the Supreme Council for the Defence of the Country, Romania's president personally launch an appeal to all Romanian citizens to directly help the victims of the disaster and the bereaved families, our brothers now in distress. [sentence as received]

On the same occasion a survey was made of the political and military situation in the neighbouring countries and on the European continent, worry being expressed about the current tensioned situation in Yugoslavia as well as the hope that order and equilibrium will be maintained in the neighbouring country.

The Supreme Council for the Defence of the Country approved the latest basic orientations and initiatives in Romania's foreign activity.

Defense Ministry Mobilizes for Flood Relief

*AU2907185591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1521 GMT 29 Jul 91*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 29/7/1991—The floods in Bacau County, especially in the water basins of the Trotus and the Siret Rivers, caused great damage to many settlements.

Still in the morning of July 29, 1991 the minister of national defence ordered the setting up of a central operative group—at the level of the Ministry of National Defence—the aim of which is to coordinate the armed forces' actions to liquidate the nefarious effects of the floods as well as the setting up of operative groups at local level.

At the local bodies' request air force subunits, engineer corps and subunits of other weapons participate in identifying the affected objectives, saving survivors and goods as well as in diminishing the effects of the flood waves.

Other subunits are ready to intervene in case the flood area expands.

65 Die in Bacau, Suceava County Floods

*AU2907135691 Bucharest Programul Unu Radio
Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 29 Jul 91*

[Text] The situation in the disaster areas of Bacau County, resulting from torrential rains last night and today, continues to be dramatic. Some 17 localities are affected; more than 500 houses were completely destroyed and another 1,500 houses were damaged by the floods. At 1530 [1230 GMT], 65 dead and more than 10,000 afflicted people were registered with the County Prefect's Office. However, the situation is under control with the county command ensuring the supply of bread, canned food, mineral water, powdered milk, flour, sugar, edible oil, sweets, and other staples.

Our Armed Forces personnel are helping the people in the disaster area; in cases of extreme emergency, the transportation of materials and people is ensured by military helicopters. The first emergency medical aid was supplied by the Bacau Health Directorate, which sent to the afflicted areas all available medical staff for emergency health assistance, for prevention against possible epidemics, and for treatment of the wounded.

Likewise, steps were further taken to contain the damage caused by floods in Suceava County. At the (Bertisesti) water collecting station, 32 wells have been made operational again, and Suceava Municipality hopes to receive drinking water from this station today. Intensive efforts are being made to reopen the Vatra Dornei- Suceava railway, which was damaged at Faltinoasa. Also as a result of the floods, the electrical supply in Gura Humorului town and in the Cornul Luncii commune was cut and the main methane gas pipeline of Bugsoaia, crossing the Moldova River, was damaged.

According to the latest data received by the Suceava Prefect's Office, 492 house were flooded in several localities in the county.

Manolescu Analyzes Decline of Unions

91BA0909B Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA
in Romanian 4 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by N.M.: "The Rise and Fall of the Trade Unions"]

[Text] After the press, the trade unions were the second domain to experience the radical changes after the revolution. Within a span of a few months, dozens, perhaps hundreds of trade union organizations appeared in every branch and at every level. Very soon they proved that they had a heavy saying in the country's socioeconomic life. In the first few months after the dictatorship was toppled, when important decisions were taken affecting millions of Romanian employees, the trade unions' contribution was essential. Neither the provisional government, nor the freshly elected managements of economic units, schools, hospitals, and many other kinds of enterprises were in a position to either ignore or circumvent the views of the trade unions when the short or long-term interests of the people they represented were on the table. However hastily they may have been organized and however inexperienced the young postrevolutionary Romanian trade unions may have been, they were indeed free and democratic structures, hostile to the bureaucracy of a state still not purged of communism, and capable of defending their members' rights against this state or successfully negotiating their pay. For a while, any call to protest actions or strikes by trade union leaders was indeed a formidable threat to an administration freshly out of revolutionary tremors. The administration knew that the trade union members were following their leaders. The leaders knew that their organization members were listening to them. The employees trusted the trade unions and their leaderships. At the beginning, the existence of such a large number of trade unions seemed to be a natural reaction to the monopoly of the former communist UGSR [General Union of Romanian Trade Unions] and a guarantee that the pluralism was not confined to the political world of parties and that it was not an empty word. However, after that Edenic period, if I may call it that, the first disquietening signals about the new trade unions came

from those organizations that had been created by cosmetically touching up older trade union structures. Soon it was noted that the wealth of the former UGSR was neither divided up nor even frozen. It was used by a number of communist trade union activists belonging to the lower echelons who replaced those previously at the top of the pyramid. The phenomenon was not limited to the trade union *nomenklatura*. It can be perceived throughout all the structures. Later, another phenomenon present throughout the society occurred: Conflicts emerged among the leaders, organizations split up, and gradually the trade unions were affected by the same kind of polarization as occurred in the political arena. The revolution was betrayed by a restoration in the trade union area, too. The authorities established their own trade unions which they pitted against those it viewed as hostile. Alternatively, they encouraged the emergence of docile trade unions with which they had less trouble negotiating. In principle, a trade union that plays into the hands of the administration is inconceivable, since the role of the trade unions is precisely to protect the employees from possible administration abuses. The fact that the communist state controlled the trade union movement was responsible for the fact that real trade unionism disappeared in our country for four decades. The FSN [National Salvation Front]-led administration also gravitated toward a similar control and it actually achieved it up to a point. Anyway, it managed to greatly curtail the power of the trade unions. One of the slogans was that the trade unions must not engage in politics. The government insisted on depoliticizing the trade union movement. Of course, the trade unions pursue salary, social, and economic objectives, but those cannot be achieved outside the realm of politics. In fact, the government wanted to castrate the trade union movement. One effective method was to discredit the leaders, towards whom the authorities behaved as they did toward the political opposition of the regime. Finally, it demoralized many of the trade union members, who allowed themselves to be persuaded that their leaders were ambitious, career-minded, and unscrupulous people.

That situation explains the current inability of the trade unions to really defend the interests of their members and to pose a threat to the administration. The current trade union bill has some characteristics that are strikingly similar in inanity with the more recent bill regulating demonstrations and meetings. The bill gives the authorities the means to prevent the trade unions from fulfilling their role. In no other democracy or at any other time did the employers have such a perfect weapon in their struggle against the trade unions as does Mr. Petre Roman's Romanian government. But the fact that a minister (I'm referring to the minister of Transportation) could stop a strike by a televised appeal was not only thanks to the existence of the bill in question. The weakness of the trade unions is greater than that and has deeper roots. We have enumerated some of them in our brief history of our trade union movement after December 1989. But there are also other reasons, which

go back to a more distant past. The trade union movement is, as is known, a product of capitalism. The first trade unions appeared in England. Romania, which until a late date did not have a large workers class conscious of its own interests, did not experience a real trade union movement until our century, and that was cut off after World War II. The peasantry, intelligentsia, and functionaries were not usually organized in trade unions before the war, either. The same situation prevails in all the countries. The large trade unions always required a large industrial population. The strength of the Polish Solidarity is directly linked to the Gdansk shipyards and the coal industry. In our country, the young trade union was handicapped by the absence of a tradition, as were other areas in which we had not acquired experience. This can be easily perceived in most of the actions initiated by the trade unions after the revolution. The most characteristic phenomenon is that in nine cases out of ten the trade unions do not keep their word. Many of the strikes announced never materialized. In December 1990 or in June 1991, the wave of strikes elicited mostly by the much steeper increase in prices than in salaries, seemed enormous at one point, quite capable of sweeping away the administration, only to break unexpectedly, turning into foam, as if it had ran into a strong obstacle. In reality, no such obstacle existed outside the trade unions themselves. The government was too weak and too scared to resist. The difficulty must be sought inside the trade union movement itself. The first explanation is that the trade union leaders were not followed by the members. The discreditation policy pursued by

the administration toward these leaders and the demagogical promises made to the masses of employees evidently did not fail to produce results. But we must not ignore a certain lack of skill on the part of the leaders themselves, who seem to not know their people very well. There have been cases in which they acted like military commanders whose orders were not carried out by the troops. Worse yet, in some cases they issued orders that could not be carried out. A second reason was the social polarization. An efficient trade union movement does not require only cartels or strong confederations—which do exist—but also a certain homogeneity among their members. Not much can be achieved in conditions in which half of the employee population would rather be siced against the other half than be persuaded to acknowledge its real interests. Small wonder then that administration envoys or agents provocateurs infiltrated by the former Securitate need no more than a few hours to undo the unity of a trade union whose leaders took many months of effort to create. The current moral and political polarization of the Romanian society allows the trade unions only risky initiatives which, instead of bolstering people's faith, end up disappointing them. In conclusion, I would say that the trade union movement is in the image of the entire Romanian society. Almost all the trade union difficulties I reviewed are experienced by the economic, political, and other institutions: moral polarization, tendencies to restore certain communist structures, the effects of forced depoliticization, the pressures brought to bear on the leaders, threats, and the credulity of the members who are being subjected to the most idiotic intoxication. In the last analysis, the rise and fall of the trade unions is no more than the rise and fall of the entire Romanian society after the revolution of December 1989.

Serbian, Croatian War Options, Strategies Analyzed

*91BA0929B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
16 Jul 91 pp 18-19*

[Article by Ante Barisic: "We Do Not Have the Forces for War"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] Although under conditions of a balance of weakness what is happening in Croatia seems to some to be a low-intensity war, a flareup of clashes would quickly show that what we are talking about is a very high-intensity conflict for both sides.

The public is already pretty much convinced that the tension in Croatian-Serbian relations has reached a point of culmination that can be resolved only by accepting the challenges imposed on us and entering into war. Many even believe that the Serbian-Croatian war has already begun, but in order for that conclusion to be valid, one must compare the possible goals of war, the committed resources, and the participants.

From the Serbian side, the main objective is to prevent Croatia from taking shape as a state. The fact that the goals are also manifested in the geopolitical guise of drawing new borders, of occupying territory and strategic directions, of looking to certain imaginary lines established from a historical-messianic perspective, does not change the fundamental objective of activities by the main adversary, and that is complete subjugation after a crushing military defeat. The first step in the repudiation of the Croatian government must be to escalate ethnic conflict, as a pretext for wider intervention by the strongest armed forces, embodied by the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army].

Sacrifice of Precan

However, that which strategists of the war option perceive as limited war, to be conducted on foreign territory, and for which the Precan Serbs would have to be sacrificed, constitutes an existential question for the Croatian side and means total war. When talking about the real relationship of force, it is necessary to break the question down into several elements.

The already stereotypical assertions about imported and inserted forces from Serbia (Chetniks, volunteers), fighting against the forces of the Republic of Croatia, have not been adequately proven thus far, because it is evident that the participants in the battles in eastern Slavonia are predominantly from the local Serbian population. It is interesting that in the majority of cases the people involved are over 40 years old, predominantly first- or second-generation immigrants from the Dinaric regions. These neighborly clashes that have seized hold of large parts of Croatia are more like fighting than they are like battles and operations, as is the case in war. Their active strategy is subordinate to the basic goal of inciting widespread conflict and overextending the

forces of the Republic of Croatia, and in this regard they are of a terroristic and provocative nature.

This conclusion is possible based on their number, the weaponry in use, the type and place of action, and the conduct of the fighting. The alleged 7,000 armed men in the so-called SAO [Serbian Autonomous Region of] Krajina militia and in what used to be the TO [territorial defense force] of that region, along with their good maneuvering skills, could be a difficult problem for the police to solve. On the other hand, equipped with light infantry weaponry of domestic origin, without better means of communication and heavier weaponry, without the protection and support of an army infrastructure, and with motivation that is diminishing as quickly as they do not enter into a major conflict, they cannot offer lengthy organized resistance under conditions where the necessary numerical advantage of the Croatian defense forces has been achieved.

Crowning Proof

The intensification of armed rebellion by some Serbian extremists after the declaration of independence by the Republic of Croatia, the mobilization of the TO and reserve militia in Serbia, the mobilization and demobilization of war units of the YPA, primarily soldiers of Serbian nationality and on a voluntary basis, and their concentration on the border with Croatia or inside Croatia itself, are new elements in assessing Serbia's actual war intentions. It appears that time is not working in their favor in terms of involvement in a real war.

The Serbian paramilitary forces that are active in the rebellious regions of Croatia, besides their task of terrorizing and preventing the institutions of the Croatian state from being established, must in one fell swoop provide the crowning proof that the Croatian government does not control its territory and population, and because of this it should not be granted recognition of sovereignty by the international community. In order to carry out this task, it was necessary to arm those who are willing to take part in the armed rebellion and to give them the illusion of legitimacy through the formation of the so-called Krajina militia and by dressing them in special uniforms. In places where this mobilization could not be carried out for various reasons, armed civilians appeared.

The process of arming these groups proceeded in various ways, from various sources, and at various intensities. What is indisputable is that the majority of the arms came from the stockpiles of the TO of the Republic of Serbia and that they were produced at the Red Flag weapons factory. These are infantry weapons (American-produced Thompson submachine guns, Soviet PPS's, M-48 rifles, M-57 machine guns and heavy machine guns, German war-booty submachine guns, and similar domestically produced submachine guns) that the YPA relinquished to the TO units after YPA units received reinforcements of contemporary infantry weaponry at the end of the 1960's.

Variety of Weapons

Furthermore, it has been noticed that the Serbian rebels have training weapons from the YPA, such as a large number of contemporary automatic guns produced in Kragujevac, often with a grenade-launcher attachment, some domestically produced PAP semi-automatic guns, and a few artillery pieces, such as mortars, recoilless guns, and single-shot bazookas.

The use of lower-caliber mortars coincides with the arrival of YPA reserve units from Serbia to Baranja and eastern Slavonia. There is an even greater lack of uniformity in terms of the types of pistols, revolvers, and bombs that are being used, which are often training weaponry from YPA units. Aside from those weapons that came from the stockpiles of the Serbian TO, part of them were seized during raids on police stations over the past 10 months, and part were obtained through illegal channels.

Under the guise of mobilization of the YPA war reserves, many Serbs in Croatia were given personal weapons that were later used in ethnic conflicts. The inadequate level of skill in using these weapons is noticeable, as is the lack of combat training among large groups, despite the instructors and training bases available to them. In contrast to other regions, the clashes in eastern Slavonia have assumed the character of street fighting, and in the cases of Glina, Mirkovac, and Tenja there are campaigns that exceed the scope of everyday police duties.

Since the true nature of the armed rebellion in Croatia is to provoke widespread conflict by militarizing ethnic conflict, the Croatian defense forces have a dually difficult task. Besides establishing public order, peace, and security throughout the entire territory of the republic, they must develop the type of defense force that would be able to respond to a large-scale attack, if such a thing happens. In this sense, the forces of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the special-purpose units, and the national guard corps, as well as the reservists of these formations, must count not only on suppressing the armed rebellion—which some would call the settling of accounts with a fifth column—but also on engaging simultaneously in a defensive war in the event of an attack by the YPA.

The concentration of YPA armored mechanized forces around Sid, Tuzla, Kupres, and Banja Luka, besides the forces located within Croatia itself, represents a serious threat to the defense forces of the Republic of Croatia. The Croatian forces are armed primarily with light infantry weapons, grenade launchers, bombs, explosives, antiaircraft and antitank missiles and guns, and light armored combat vehicles, enough for no more than 85,000 combatants. Part of this weaponry was captured in fighting with rebels and immediately put to use. A military expert from Ljubljana, Dr. Antun Bebler, estimates that this weaponry is weaker than what the Slovene TO has, and that the competence and level of training of the Croatian defense forces is not at the same

level as that of the Slovene TO, which held several maneuvers before clashing with the YPA.

Croatian Forces

The latest experience from clashes in Banija and eastern Slavonia show that there are problems with logistical support of the units participating in the fighting (a lack of and untimely delivery of ammunition, technical problems with armored vehicles due to the overheating of engines, punctured tires, poor communication, or the possibility of being blockaded). There were also heavy losses of human forces, and efforts are being made to adapt warfare tactics to this. Certain disagreements were noted in terms of the operative leadership of units between the higher and lower levels, as well as in relations between various branches and levels of the republican government.

Aside from the offensive campaigns undertaken, a blockade of rebel sites is being established, and when launching attacks an effort is being made to use as many armored combat resources and other defensive means as possible, while it is hoped that a numerical advantage can be achieved in the fighting at specific locales through better maneuvering and agility. The difficulties involved with the supply of arms and ammunition are being bridged by developing the broadest initiative, the result of which is the new HOV-1 armored vehicle. As far as can be inferred, the vehicle was made at the Split Shipyard as an addition to the chassis of a mobile-crane truck produced under English license. There is no indication that the personnel carrier has been tested, and it even remains to be seen how the engine component, for example, will hold up in extended combat use or when there will be a significant possibility of damage to the tires, during exposure to antiarmor fire with its unpositioned armor, and during encounters with antitank mines.

It should be remembered that the Croatian media, based on the Slovene model, are more actively and vigorously involved in following events, creating an impression among the public of the seriousness of a situation bordering on war. The link between the YPA and those Serbs who have engaged in armed rebellion is being documented with the explanation that their lives are threatened, and the transformation of the YPA into a monoethnic army as well as the danger of large-scale military intervention are being pointed out.

The YPA forces in Croatia are estimated at approximately 70,000 people, the mobilization in Serbia has engaged a reported 200,000 people, with approximately 30,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while in Montenegro the response was poorer than expected. These forces are armed and prepared to very different degrees, and their level of motivation varies. In YPA units, stores of food, fuel, and ammunition have been laid away, and steps have been taken to defend them from attack. Training exercises with live ammunition and various other kinds of activities by the YPA on the territory of Croatia are

contributing to the creation of a war psychosis. The YPA is pursuing a policy of making its presence known and demonstrating full combat readiness amidst the introduction of strict discipline.

The effected partial mobilization of Croatian defense forces, which have dug in and positioned themselves in such a way that they can effectively resist the aforementioned concentrations of active and reserve forces of the YPA and of the Serbian and Montenegrin TO's, is an indication of the extent and seriousness of the defensive preparations undertaken.

The economic war against Croatia continues (the seizure of property owned by Croatian enterprises in Serbia, the destruction of tourism, lost earnings from transport services, threats to agriculture), and was recently intensified by a decision by the governor of the NBY [National Bank of Yugoslavia] that Croatia will not be awarded prime-issue currency. The propaganda war has been going on for years now with undiminished intensity, and has been heightened by charges of treason and secession after the decision on Croatian independence and its disassociation from Yugoslavia.

Third Calvary

The breadth and depth of the Croatian-Serbian conflict is being exploited right now through support for the Serbs in Croatia in their refusal to recognize the Croatian state and to maintain political communication with it, as well as in the aspiration to inflict the amount of economic damage necessary to break the back of Croatian power and force it into political surrender. Although the war propagandists are striving to convince the public that major war preparations have been taken on both sides, that tens of thousands of people have been mobilized, that weapons have been taken out of storage and that wartime production is being launched, or that the parties in power already have to act under war conditions, it appears that there is nevertheless a balance of power that does not permit the breakout of actual war.

Regardless of the fact that under conditions of a balance of weakness, what is happening in Croatia seems to some to be a low-intensity war, if it came to an expansion and deepening of conflict it would quickly become evident that what we are talking about is a very high-intensity conflict for both sides, which they would certainly not be able to sustain economically. The Republic of Croatia will not want to miss out on its historical chance to realize sovereignty and independence, just as the Serbian political leadership is intent on subordinating itself to its own imperial goals and the YPA, seeing in it a powerful, and perhaps the only, means for realizing the goals of its policy. If we assume that both sides have decided to go all the way in achieving the goals that they have set out, and that both sides reinforce their goals in the political, ideological, or historical domain, then it is of critical importance to the question of war and peace that neither of the conflicting sides has the economic strength to achieve the goals that it has set out.

Amidst the antiwar and antimilitaristic attitude that is spreading across Yugoslavia, the fact of the economic weakness of all the actors in the Yugoslav war simulation is undermining the conviction that the first Croatian-Serbian war conflict is inevitable. Croatian regiments within the army of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the army of the Kingdom of Serbia fought each other once upon a time during the World War I, and the two nations comparably passed through the Calvary of civil war during the World War II, so that it is not right that for the third time in the same century clashes should definitively shed blood in a mutual settling of accounts. This time, specifically, they are not mobilized for anyone else's sake and they must simply come face to face with the somber picture of their own existence and survival. War would mean surrendering everyone over to silent death and a common dying off, while a return to a political solution of conflicts and a settlement of relations would lead both nations to the respectable community of full-grown, mature, and civilized European nations. This is how both Croats and Serbs should be freed of their increasingly dark dreams, thereby washing away the taint of the barbarian who knows of no other way to resolve difficult questions than with weapons.

Possibility of Nuclear Civil War Feared

91BA0939A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jul 91
pp 29-30

[Article by Dragan Jovanovic: "Krsko: Nuclear Civil War"]

[Text] In the general uproar over the "bombing" of the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant [NE] and the beginning of a nuclear civil war, TANJUG's three-line report went unnoticed to the effect that "a work team of the government of the Republic of Croatia has completed a proposal of criteria for selection of sites for thermal and nuclear power plants and for nuclear waste disposal facilities on the territory of Croatia."

This scant report, timed in the middle of the media nuclear war raging over the dome of NE Krsko, suggests at least two (insane) things: First, that Tudjman is still being financed by "Westinghouse," i.e., the world nuclear lobby; and second, that the present Croatian government is prepared for the long-term nuclear option, which in critical situations like this can in a moment be redirected to military purposes. No one at this point is even mentioning that the current war between the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] is above all a war for the radioactive "waste" from NE Krsko. After all, everywhere in the world nuclear power plants are also factories for plutonium (why not at Krsko as well) which are incidentally generating power as well and are thus camouflaging the principal reason for their existence.

Why would General Tudjman, renegade from the YPA, behave differently from this unwritten rule, and why would he not issue at least a discreet threat of plutonium

from Krsko? Why would he behave differently from Saddam Husayn? In other words, when Israeli planes can cut holes in an empty Iraqi reactor, why would "our" planes not make it known that they are ready to make holes in the reactor at Krsko, which is shut down temporarily?

The Insane "Air Show"

It is enough for these questions to pass through the minds of the generals in the supreme headquarters for us to have an "air show" over Krsko in which "three YPA warplanes several times performed the maneuver of close pass in low flight from opposite directions precisely over the nuclear power plant."

But let us take things in order from the news item that stated that last week "a work team of the government of the Republic of Croatia has completed a proposal of criteria for selection of sites for thermal and nuclear power plants and for nuclear waste disposal facilities on the territory of Croatia." Tudjman, then, is not backing off from the nuclear program even under these wartime conditions, which is to say that he is being driven to it by some great need. Tudjman has never denied the reports—which have been going around not only in the Belgrade press but also in the press of Bosnia and Slovenia—that "Westinghouse" (which built NE Krsko) financed the general's election campaign in Croatia. "Croatia Bank" was founded in London for that purpose; it was liquidated just as soon as Tudjman won the election. The figure of \$2 million has even been mentioned.

It is interesting that the decision of the Croatian government on further construction of nuclear power plants came soon after Tudjman's recent visit—to London! And Croatia's decision to go ahead with construction of nuclear power plants violates yet another very important federal law. This is the law on the moratorium on construction of nuclear power plants in Yugoslavia, adopted three years ago in the SFRY Assembly against fierce opposition of Ante Markovic and also the YPA. In the session in which that antinuclear law was passed, Admiral Ivan Veselinovic moved that that law be removed from the agenda. But the admiral's intervention acted like a boomerang: Both the Croatian and Slovene delegates voted in favor of the law, although before Adm. Veselinovic's speech they had been ready to vote against, because they considered the law pro-Serbian (because it allegedly favored Serbian coal and electricity). After the law's adoption, during the recess, I went up to Adm. Brovet and told him that Adm. Veselinovic's statement had unintentionally done the YPA a disservice, because the entire Western press would adopt the interpretation that our Army is interested in a nuclear program. Brovet replied that I was exaggerating.

And somewhat earlier, during the reign of another admiral, Branko Mamula, I asked him in public, in NIN, why he is the one responsible for Krsko on behalf of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Central

Committee and is the Army interested in a nuclear program? I was answered by Ivan Medvedec, who at that time was director of NE Krsko, to the effect that Mamula, if I really was very interested, would at some point explain it to me.

Will Gen. Tudjman at least explain why he intends to build a nuclear power plant precisely at Dalje on the Danube? Why he has designated for the nuclear waste disposal facility a national park on Papuk and Psunj? And why Leo Seserko, deputy Slovenian prime minister, believes that a good site would be on the territory of SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina "because the Serbs there are resistant even to radioactive waste"?

Why, then, locate future nuclear power plants and nuclear disposal sites precisely in the areas where Croatia borders the "rest of Yugoslavia"? There is also an answer for that.

Five years ago, a columnist specializing in military policy made the case for this kind of border placement of nuclear power plants, along the Danube and the Hungarian border, in the Zagreb magazine DANAS, one of his arguments being the strategic and security advantages should there be a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia! In other words: The nuclear power plants crowded on the Yugoslav-Hungarian border (at that time, they were even thinking of 30 nuclear power plants) would halt the tanks of the Warsaw Pact by their mere dangerous presence.

The Warsaw Pact no longer exists, but there are the "occupying" tanks of the YPA, and so the sites for nuclear power plants and nuclear waste disposal sites remain on Croatia's eastern borders. Fortunately, nuclear power plants are not built overnight (they take between six and 12 years to build), and in the meantime we will eliminate one another in a conventional civil war. But if it is really necessary, there is NE Krsko—should the war drag on, and there is also the "Triga" research center in Podgorica, which YPA helicopters flew over the other day.

What is "Triga"?

It is a small nuclear research center in which experiments are conducted with a nuclear reactor that has a power of 1.5 MW and is fueled by enriched uranium 235. At one time, there was a report in the German DER SPIEGEL from which the conclusion could be drawn that both at "Triga" and also at "Rudjer Boskovic" they were trying in certain laboratories to master the technologies of processing fissionable material for military purposes.

The Big Worry About "Triga"

History will probably show that the conflict between Tito and Rankovic was not because of "bugging" nor because of similar nonsense, but because of a quite serious matter: over the destiny of the Yugoslav atomic bomb. Without going into who favored further development of the military nuclear program and who was against, it is only with the fall of Aleksandr Rankovic

that the Nuclear Institute at Vinca and Pavle Savic, our pioneer in fission, a member of the academy who until that time had been untouchable, lost their power. All the important scientific research in the nuclear field was slowly moved to the "Rudjer Boskovic" Nuclear Institute in Zagreb and the "Jozef Stefan" Institute in Ljubljana. The Yugoslav nuclear program was slowly taken over and supervised by Dr. Hrvoje Pozar, member of the academy (at one time, president of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts), who was also to become one of the ring leaders of the Croatian mass movement in the seventies. Dr. Bozidar Udovicic, the present Croatian minister for energy who is pushing the nuclear program with all his strength, was to become the best pupil of Academician Pozar. Udovicic would be the genius who proposed building 30 nuclear power plants by the year 2000.

In all these years, no one knows for sure what is being studied at "Rudjer Boskovic," "Jozef Stefan," or "Triga." It seems that even the YPA does not know. Or it knows and it has decided on kamikaze overflights of both Krsko and "Triga," thus making it known that there will be no mercy for anyone if they "mess" there with atoms without its knowledge and oversight.

In their grasshopping overflight of NE Krsko (for which the YPA received a serious reproach from George Bush, former war pilot, who knows from personal experience to what such madness leads), the YPA pilots "drew" from the nuclear custodians alarming secret data from the "strictly confidential" documentation of our nuclear power plant. According to Marjan Lenstek, deputy director of the Slovenian Administration for Nuclear Safety, the most dangerous part of this "Westinghouse" power plant is the "reactor—it is protected by a high dome of reinforced concrete that is 70 cm thick, and below that one meter of empty space, and then steel sheet 3.5 cm thick(!)"

The Shell-Like Dome

Anyone who knows anything about these problems might think at first that sheet 3.5 cm thick on the dome of a nuclear reactor is a flagrant typographical error in the newspaper.

But even Damir Subasic, M.A., and chief of the Office for Nuclear Power Installations in the Croatian Ministry of Energy and Industry, told DANAS that "beneath the 76-mm (this presumably really is a typographical error)-thick concrete shield there is a steel shield 3.6 cm thick which encloses the reactor." Which is to say that it really could be penetrated by Seselj's dum-dum bullets.

It is only after these statements that it becomes clear why the people responsible for Krsko have always said that the nuclear power plant's construction cost only \$600 million, when it is well known that construction of this kind of nuclear power plant cannot be less expensive than \$1.5 billion. There was a saving, then, on the material and on the quality of the material. And that this is reminiscent of the nuclear power plant at Three Mile

Island, which was also built by "Westinghouse." When they were ascertaining the causes of the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, they established that there had been a saving on the thickness of the concrete wall and on the steel plating. The thickness of both the concrete wall and the steel wall of the reactor was literally cut in half: Nor was the best quality steel installed, and the welds on the steel seams were not as good as they should have been. Our own "Krskobyl" has for years now been showing all those symptoms and many others (bad pipes in the steam generator, pipe vibration). They know about this even in the International Agency in Vienna, but they have been closing their eyes to the faults, just as they have been looking the other way in spite of the fact that Krsko was built "in a markedly seismic region."

The airplanes of the YPA were swooping down on all of that, but Europe, it seems, is still not taking seriously the nuclear option of civil war in Yugoslavia, and is not taking into account that in Europe there are madder people than the Israelis and Iraqis and that they are the Serbs and the Croats.

The European Community ought to show an urgent concern for the nuclear option of civil war in the Balkans and immediately mothball NE Krsko and transport its nuclear waste to some reliable disposal sites of its own Europe—so that the plutonium from Krsko is not soon used for military purposes (or at least as the strongest political weapon for any kind of blackmail not only of Yugoslavia, but also of Europe). After all, if that should happen, then a *corde sanitaire* around Yugoslavia will not help: Europe will be in the nuclear clutches of the Balkans.

Djodan's Tasks as Defense Minister Assessed

91BA0929A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
16 Jul 91 pp 16-17

[Article by Marinko Culic: "The Croatian God Mars"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] Djodan is a man for "special duties" who will calmly allow the wider public to treat him like an incessant chatterbox.

Show us who the Kosovans are and we will mow them down—this was one of the first "commands" issued by the new Croatian minister of defense, Dr. Sime Djodan.

He did this publicly, before television cameras, at a time when he was being watched by an audience that had undoubtedly never been so sizeable and so shaken, and to whom Djodan at that moment perhaps seemed like the only counterweight to the "crazy" Adzic. Aware of the role that had fallen to his lot, Djodan acted in the manner of all well-versed military leaders: He praised the strength of his adversary—coldly assessing that a strike against Croatia would be significantly more virulent than the "peripheral blow" sustained by Slovenia—although immediately adding that the Croatian response

would be decisive and successful, regardless of the anticipated sacrifices (suffering will be endured by "as many Croats as will have to perish in the defense of an independent and free state").

Croatia's civilian minister of defense thus presented himself as a minister of war, and like an angry watchdog at the gates of the Croatian homeland, he notified potential attackers that perhaps they can fare well elsewhere, but they cannot pass across the Croatian threshold.

Has the creator of the already-famous neologism concerning the "Croatian machine gun on the Croatian shoulder" now promised too much to the potential attacker?

Addressing that attacker, and without first conducting even an initial military review of Croatian units, Djodan clearly acted more in the manner of a crowd-worker and political animator, of the type which everyone recognizes in him, than as a Navy officer, which is the fact about him that the wider public has learned only recently. Because even if he wanted to hide certain facts about the actual readiness of the Croatian army, Djodan would have been least able to do so before the Army, since it disarmed the Croatian territorial defense force last year, which, experts contend, feels inferior even today in relation to the Slovene territorial defense force (which did not allow itself to be disarmed). If it is known that the disarming of the Croatian territorial defense force was somewhat equally supported by the new and the old government (Manolic brought back what Latin could not), then Djodan's appointment as minister of defense acquires an overtone from the previously known, but not always noticeable role that he had in the ruling party. He is a man for "special duties" who will calmly allow the wider public to treat him like an incessant chatterbox and whose big mouth has cost him his career: from vice president of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], he fell to the post of "ordinary" Croatian Assembly deputy. At the right moment, however, the careful observer will also notice an occasional statement of a different nature ("I promised Tudjman that I will come forward at decisive moments"; "I was a key advisor in the Mesic government.") The fact that this is not frivolous boastfulness is confirmed by his appearances during the preelection period before the "Croatian flag in Romania" and similar moves, which like a bulldozer cleared the way for the appearance of the "most Croatian" party, ensuring for it more radicalism than anyone else on the Croatian political scene dared to show, while at the same time guarding the official leadership of the HDZ from the charge that it is actually a party with "dangerous intentions."

All indications are that there has been a conscious decision by Djodan to be used as an "ice-breaker" for his party, who will put his unquestionable authority at the disposal of the party whenever and however necessary, something that is borne out by the fact that his "hawk" and "dove" phases alternate in identifiable unison with

momentary party interests. Thus, when the people of Virovitica were brought to Zagreb during the winter, where they were later tried, Djodan did not call for battle from the balcony on Ban Jelacic Square, as many probably expected him to do, instead depicting their transport as a temporarily unavoidable sacrifice to be borne by Croatian democracy. Several months later, another dimension of this unexpected restraint by Djodan became more clear, in connection with the increasingly pronounced "stubbornness" of the Slavonian wing of the HDZ, which had almost entirely cast off control by Zagreb headquarters. The fact that Djodan's appointment to the ministerial post was connected to this, i.e., to the insistence that this hard wing be returned to party subordination, is shown by his statement during the aforementioned premier television appearance to the effect that the Osijek police undertook action in Tenja "at its own initiative, and only then informed the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Croatia." But the danger that the Slavonian "schism" could imply for the ruling party is not linked solely to this possibility, specifically, that Glavas, Mercep, or some third party will draw into question the unity of the Croatian defensive shield through uncontrolled actions.

Perhaps the even greater danger lies in the fact that the Slavonian leaders of the HDZ are firmly rooted in their membership, which has already shown that it has no intention of sacrificing them to the "indecisive people" in Zagreb. Thus, when this distinctive feature of the Slavonian hard wing is compared to other radicals (Milas, Vukojevic, Susak)—and including Djodan himself—this proves to be an enormous advantage. Because none of the people mentioned has such a solid "base" as the Slavonians (Djodan's connections in his native Benkovac region are much shakier), because of which the party leadership can control them much more easily and even use them for "special duties," as they are now doing with Djodan.

For those with a better knowledge of the new minister of defense, there is no doubt that he will perform these duties because of the special characteristics that he allegedly exhibited even as a member of the former ruling party. Nikola Viskovic recently praised him (and saved him from being ejected from the party), but they say that in many other cases Djodan acted differently and radically settled scores with those who violated LC [League of Communists] party discipline. Djodan himself was admitted into the party, and before that into a Partisan unit, according to his own admission, by Simo Dubajic, only to be subsequently thrown out both because of his "rash" nature (in 1946, as he himself says, he broke a bottle over the head of an Italian officer from the Garibaldi Division who had said that Rijeka and the Istrian Peninsula are Italian) and because he clashed with the program, resolutions, and statutes of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] and the LCC [League of Communists of Croatia] (1971 and before that 1963).

One year after his third expulsion, Djodan was sentenced to six years' imprisonment (from one of which he was pardoned) based on the charge that through inimical actions at public meetings and elsewhere he had damaged Yugoslav unity. Behind this charge, however, was something unspoken, and much more serious. As one of the most popular university professors of the day, Djodan was one of the creators of the theory of clear accounts, which, especially in polemics with Suvar, developed into the assertion of the "plundering of Croatia." He holds to the basic precepts of this theory to this day, recently emphasizing that "there are exact indicators that all the republics have developed faster than Croatia." But in many people's opinion, Djodan has never had much luck with the figures necessary to prove this, and if we are to judge from several of his latest statements, figures have remained his weak point to this very day.

Thus, it was in fact he who predicted an influx of \$150 billion that emigree Croats could invest in the Croatian economy, which, as we know, has come to naught. This shows Djodan's tendency to sacrifice, when necessary, the half of himself where Djodan the economist is found, to his other, political half (by his own admission he still has a "Marxist orientation").

But even though Djodan the politician has now almost entirely displaced Djodan the scholar, even today he is reportedly making deft use of his professorial biography, and some allege that his ministerial promotion was influenced somewhat by his membership in a group of professors whose members help each other to rapidly climb the political ladder (Ramljak, Cvitan, Djodan...). Thanks to these discrete connections, which are in such stark contrast to the customary image of Djodan as a lone hawk (he calls himself a "lion"—when the interests of Croatia are at stake), his promotion to the ministerial post was perhaps a surprise to everyone except himself. In contrast to Boljkovac and Spegelj, who supposedly first heard about their own appointments on TV, Djodan was clearly not surprised by his promotion as minister; indeed, he himself had even announced it repeatedly.

What can be expected from Djodan in his new role? Even at the very outset, he has presented himself as a minister of war, and it is being seen that regardless of the delicacy of the moment, he will remain faithful to strong words (although it is hard to believe that he could ever repeat the sentence from the heated preelection days about the formation of 300 Croatian divisions who will "turn Serbia into a little blotch").

It is easy to anticipate that the West will not gladly accept the appearance of a minister who, at least in word, is more committed to war than to peace, a peace on which outsiders are so insistent. In the eyes of the world, which does not necessarily know about all the fine points of cadre somersaults in Croatia, Djodan's appointment could even be regarded as an attempt, after Slovenia, for Croatia, too, to call on the assistance of the "god Mars" in order to move closer to full independence along the

knife's edge, based on our northern neighbor's model. But regardless of how reasonable this concern is, Djodan's appointment also provides for a somewhat different reading of that which it truly signifies. Perhaps the new minister replaced the old one—the quiet but clearly more militarily prepared Spegelj—simply in order that Croatia, which cannot accept war with the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army], can repeat, at least in words, what the Slovenes did by accepting open conflict with the Army. A verbose Djodan, with his effusions of rage already taken into account, would in this way play the role of a wartime "minister for the people" who could return self-confidence to the population which is now disoriented because it is being bombarded by increasing evidence that the Army is ready to settle scores with Croatia as well; at the same time, he could call on them to remain calm and not "be tricked by provocation." Whether this assessment is accurate is becoming clearer, because in recent times many other people from the Croatian leadership (Domljan, Hitrec) are also swooping down on the YPA with increasingly vehement words, while at the same time cautiously weighing out the steps to take against it. Moreover, even Sime Djodan himself is emphasizing that the main force of the Fifth Military District is stationed in Croatia and, as he says, "God forbid that what could happen will happen," meaning that the current limited clashes turn into total war. If even the vehement and uncompromising Djodan recognizes this, then we must believe that there are very good reasons for caution.

Bucar on Slovenia's Relations With Yugoslavia

91BA0932A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 13 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by Slovene Assembly President France Bucar: "We Will Not Embrace Yugoslavia"]

[Text] The fundamental question now arises of how we should determine our policy for the future period of 90 days, as provided by the agreement reached on the moratorium. In this regard, we are proceeding from the fundamental determination that the European Twelve have completely adhered to the position that Yugoslavia should be preserved within its present borders. Furthermore, of course, they are asserting that it is not possible to preserve Yugoslavia in its present form and that it is consequently necessary to arrive at a new structure for Yugoslavia through negotiations. The preservation of Yugoslavia is therefore in their political interest, but they are not exactly insisting on a specific form. In that regard, they have come closer to our original demands from a year ago, or some time further back. We have also consented to any form of a new alliance whatsoever, from a confederation to an economic community, or any other form of alliance agreed upon. Our position in that respect has been that we will still only agree upon that from the position of an independent state.

The events that followed our constitutional declaration of independence, i.e., the JLA [Yugoslav People's Army] armed attack against Slovenia, have essentially changed

our position. We are demanding complete state independence, and we can talk about possible ties with the rest of Yugoslavia later on as an independent state. On that point, our starting points differ from those of the EC. Specifically, we are not prepared to cooperate with any sort of action that would lead to the restoration of the former Yugoslavia, with the participation of Yugoslavia as well. The EC's efforts are heading precisely in that direction. The Federal Government is now already trying to use the Brioni declaration to impose upon us its own model for the future Yugoslavia: essentially a centralized state, in which Belgrade would have authority with respect to all important economic sectors, the Army, foreign affairs, and finances. We would be in an even worse position than we are today.

Consequently, the Federal Government's efforts to have us keep our representatives in the bodies of the Federal authorities, especially in the Assembly, the Presidency, and the Government, are aimed precisely at that goal. It would like to create the impression that nothing at all has happened in Yugoslavia, and that that state is functioning normally. People are already acting and behaving as if the Army intervention had not happened at all, and as if nothing at all had happened politically in Yugoslavia.

These are the critical issues that are emerging after the Brioni declaration. We have made a commitment that for three months we will suspend the further implementation of our steps toward independence, reach an agreement on our future mutual relations, and also have the EC help us in those negotiations. We consented to the negotiations, but now the key question is what we are to negotiate about and how we should negotiate. We will probably also be under severe pressure from the EC to negotiate on reconstituting Yugoslavia. That question no longer comes into consideration for us. We will only negotiate on the conditions arising after our becoming independent from Yugoslavia—including the issues that still affect us during the transitional period, until we cut that umbilical cord completely. This applies in particular to issues in the monetary and financial areas. Also, for example, we can no longer negotiate on whether the JLA should remain in Slovenia for some transitional period even after our independence, as we had offered previously.

Consequently, there cannot be any question at all as to whether we should maintain our representatives in Federal bodies, unless so specified by Federal law.

We absolutely have to persist in such a position, because otherwise we will remain in Yugoslavia. Wrong moves in that area could ruin all of our efforts to date, both in the political and the defense areas. We have to be aware that in that regard as well we will also be exposed to powerful pressure, with such a position allegedly being contrary to the Brioni declaration, which would require the normal functioning of all Federal bodies, with the participation of Slovenia as well—which is the position that the Federal Government has adhered to.

Muslim Bosnian Leader on Bosnia's Fate

*91BA0929C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
16 Jul 91 pp 28-29*

[Interview with Adil Zulfikarpasic, leader of the Muslim Bosnian Organization, by Fahrudin Radoncic; place and date not given: "We Are Seeking European Assistance"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] Muslims are not armed, but weapons are easy to get right now.

In a plan for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina [BH] is a compelling and important target, and after the latest events, one can rightly say that it is obvious that Bosnia's turn has come. This is what we were told, with noticeable concern in his voice, by Adil Zulfikarpasic, the leader of the Muslim Bosnian Organization [MBO], whose opinion in these dramatic Bosnia-Herzegovinan events is awaited with attention. Still, he adds, one cannot blame others for everything.

[Zulfikarpasic] They were our mistakes too. For example, after the convincing defeat of the Communists in multiparty elections, something that did not happen anywhere else to such a degree, BH had to join the democratic bloc of Slovenia and Croatia. In this way, these two republics as well would receive much more attention in the world and in Europe.

It was necessary to do this not because there were Slovenes and Croats involved, but rather for political reasons, for freedom and democracy. The transparent message of Bosnianhood was a path into Europe with Bosnia-Herzegovina, a land inhabited by Bosnians, Serbs, Croats....It is tragic, but all forces have been applied to see to it that the Muslim masses not accept their Bosnianhood. Since in the end that did not happen, the dominant effect was that the Bosnian question was not internationalized in a timely and adequate manner. You see, Yugoslav Albanians are much less known in Europe than Bosnian Muslims. But nevertheless, with their national program the Albanians have become an important international political factor that is taken into account and that enjoys the support and sympathy of the world.

[Radoncic] Could BH, or rather the Muslims, succeed in this?

[Zulfikarpasic] I am afraid that it won't happen that quickly. The Muslims today are in the worst and most difficult situation in their history. Most of all, there is genuine confusion surrounding them. Some regard them as Yugoslav Muslims, as Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian Muslims. But the tragedy in this is that they do not regard themselves as a nation, but rather as a religious collective. Repression against them or even their destruction can at some point be treated and regarded as an internal settling of scores, in which—according to this logic—one should not interfere.

[Radoncic] Doesn't the mistake lie in the fact that the Communists recognized the Muslims as a nation, but did not give them a name that differs from the religious designation?

[Zulfikarpasic] In any event, the Communists are responsible. But also responsible is the largest Muslim party, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]. When it won the elections, this was followed by the census, where no one prevented us from designating ourselves as Bosnians. In its political program, the SDA reinforced what the Communists had created. This was done with the help of the same ideologists who previously helped the Communists, and who today have become the ideologists of the SDA's national program.

[Radoncic] Would there have been efforts to dismantle BH if the Muslims had declared themselves to be Bosnians?

[Zulfikarpasic] Everything is different if a nation has an absolute majority in a country. When you count up all the Muslims who identified themselves as Croats, Serbs, or Yugoslavs, they account for around 53 percent in BH. We respect their national designation, but they are part of the Bosnian element. Everything would be different if more than half of the population identified with Bosnianhood and said: "We are Bosnians, and we seek assistance in preserving our homeland." It would be clear to everyone that this is a separate national collective. Right now, however, Muslims see themselves as a part of the Muslim masses in, say, Macedonia or Saudi Arabia. They do not represent any national factor. It is hard for them to be the subject of a political program and equally hard for them to expect major support from the outside. To all of this must be added the fact that the internationalization of the Bosnian question was begun too late, with a delay of more than six months. For this reason, we in the MBO, together with parties that recognize the sovereignty of BH, decided that it was most urgent that we form a delegation that should travel to Brussels and inform the European Community of the situation and significance of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state.

[Radoncic] But doesn't that already seem to late to you?

[Zulfikarpasic] It is late. It will be very difficult to stop the war machinery that has been set in motion. We do not have anything with which we could do that. But we will do everything to mobilize our nation, our public, the world, and Europe in order to prevent this. Indeed, Prof. Muhamed Filipovic and I, in our political statements and articles, warned about this much earlier, and unfortunately things are transpiring just as we predicted.

[Radoncic] How do you regard BH's chances of survival?

[Zulfikarpasic] If Muslim forces do not close their eyes to the evident and obvious problems, and Muslims act as a state-building nation who regard this land as their own, then we have a chance of preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Radoncic] Are you thinking here of a Muslim national state?

[Zulfikarpasic] We can never preserve it as a Muslim state. Under no circumstances. No matter how much understanding Europe has for the difficult situation of a nation, it can never and will not accept the existence anywhere of a religious state, based and founded on one religion. All the more so since there is a thinly veiled conflict with Islam in Europe, which is not of modern origin.

[Radoncic] What will happen to BH if the Serbs and Croats, in the manner proposed, for example, by Drago Slav Mihajlovic Mihiz, decide to accede to Serbia or Croatia as their "motherlands"?

[Zulfikarpasic] In that case, the Muslims will be in a very critical and dangerous situation from which it will be hard for them to benefit.

[Radoncic] And so could it happen that Muslims will have to choose between Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia?

[Zulfikarpasic] It's possible. There have been traumatic declarations about this. Several days ago, Alija Izetbegovic told OSLOBODJENJE that it is "better to be enslaved than partitioned." Indeed, there is a grain of truth in this. Because if we are all together, then our prospects will not have definitively come to naught. Still, Izetbegovic forgets that who you're talking to about the prospects of slavery is in fact the West in a depression, and this is not good, nor politically prudent. In theory, the choice in your question is possible, but in practice it is difficult to implement. The people would have a hard time accepting that they must choose for one side or the other, and I think that that will never happen.

[Radoncic] Izetbegovic has said very decidedly and energetically that BH will not remain in a Yugoslavia without Croatia and Slovenia, and that its departure is in something like a matter of days.

[Zulfikarpasic] If the known scenario were to be realized, the Muslims would find themselves inside Greater Serbia. That clearly cannot be permitted. This is why we are so insistent on an internationalization of the problem, on the mobilization of world public opinion and, especially, of the Muslim nation.

[Radoncic] Can Muslims defend their nation status in any way other than through political means?

[Zulfikarpasic] I think they can.

[Radoncic] With weapons?

[Zulfikarpasic] We are probably the only nation without weapons. But acquiring and using them in today's Yugoslav jungle is clearly not impossible. In addition, the question here relates simply to our motivation in defending this country. Indeed, we are not in the same type of situation as our opponents, but with time we can

choose the status and position in which we will certainly emerge victorious later on. In the short term, this is not possible.

[Radoncic] A state of emergency has been declared in Banja Luka, and the republican government was not even asked about it; in the environs of Mostar, barricades are being erected and vehicles are being fired on; and Radio Sarajevo broadcast an interview with a leader of the Chetniks, who are blocking the roads. In your opinion, where will all this end, and is there even a solution?

[Zulfikarpasic] The current situation can be resolved only through political negotiations. The unfortunate thing about this is that one side does not and will not want this. It has already marked out its course, gathered up its major war machinery, mobilized all national and material resources, which—and this is the worst part of it—includes the Army. All this indicates that the current situation cannot be resolved by the ruling coalition of so-called national parties in BH. The only way to resolve the disputes is through intervention by the European Community and the United Nations and, if the conflict unfolds here, through the sending in of international troops that will prevent the destruction of the nation and the faith. We must persevere in this. Because today we have two types of politician, and everything becomes clear based on what they say. The one group talks about agreements and the possibility of achieving them, about the need for political talks and arrangements. With the other group, you see the cold logic of warfare, the organization and continuance of precisely defined goals, a brutal ability to invert and misinterpret facts. Propaganda is being used that is identical to that used by the Nazis before attacking Poland, or the Stalinists before attacking Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

[Radoncic] Finally, what is your assessment of the development of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zulfikarpasic] In any event, I see a scenario of ethnic war between Serbs and Croats, where BH becomes a battlefield that has to be cleared up. The Croats want to create a buffer zone and peace, while the Serbs want to realize the goal of their national union into one state, and because of that they want to control Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is an uncompromising situation. The only way out is international involvement and an energetic reaction by Europe and the world. And that is the only thing that can bring a positive political effect.

[Radoncic] Does that mean that the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina is more in the hands of the world and international political factors than in the hands of its citizens and Yugoslavia?

[Zulfikarpasic] Absolutely. There is no doubt about it.

Vojvodina Hungarians Ready To Live in Serbia

91BA0940A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jul 91
pp 26-28

[Interview with Andras Agoston, president of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, by Velizar Zecevic, Stevan Niksic, and Slobodan Reljic; place and date not given: "We Will Enroll Even Kertes"]

[Text] Andras Agoston, president of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM], has at times been accused of creating an "autonomy-oriented," "nationalistic," "irridentist," and "conspiratorial" organization, even a "branch" of the Hungarian state in Serbia.... As time has passed, Mr. Agoston and his party have become a normal part of the pluralistic scene—political rivals, but less and less frequently enemies in the eyes of the "normal" Serbian parties. The leader of the Hungarian minority in Serbia (today undisputed) spoke in the offices of NIN with Velizar Zecevic, Stevan Niksic, and Slobodan Reljic.

"The intention of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians," Agoston says, "is to defend the interests of Vojvodina Hungarians. We achieved what is for all practical purposes a double success in the elections. First, we consider it a success when an ethnic minority manages to have representatives in the parliament of the state in which it lives in proportion to its numbers in the total population. And second, we managed to establish ourselves as a political force. Slightly over 80 percent of the Hungarians voted for this community."

[NIN] And what about Hungarians from other parts of Yugoslavia?

[Agoston] We have organized in such a way as to operate politically on the territory of Vojvodina, that is, in the Republic of Serbia. This does not mean that we do not have good political relations with organizations of Hungarians in Croatia and Slovenia. In practice, we have established the same relation there as we have with political organizations in other countries.

[NIN] You are actually more an ethnic movement than a party?

[Agoston] We have said from the beginning that we cannot and do not want to be a party. First: Every ethnic minority in the society where it lives has certain basic interests which it must work for, and if we want to preserve that function, then we must be very broad. We must accept the approach to the movement of all those interested in those specific interests of the ethnic minority, regardless of the political views they have. Thus, in our organization we have not envisaged any firm internal discipline at all. There is no such thing as expulsion. We are even thinking, although we have more than 25,000 registered members, of no longer trying to go for the size of the membership, but to adopt our program and simply go to the Hungarians, ring the doorbell, and solicit money for that.

[NIN] In practical terms, you want to attract and rally all Hungarians regardless of the party to which they belong. Would you enroll even Mr. Kertes, deputy of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] in your organization?

[Agoston] Listen here, we have to enroll everyone who signs an application. We accept them to pay dues, but we will not expel them if they do not.

[NIN] What is your place in the Serbian parliament?

[Agoston] First, we have taken the position that in the parliament we will represent the interests of the citizens of all electoral units in which we operate. Second, the DZVM represents the interests of our ethnic minority. And from the outset we have been committed to operate within the framework of the opposition.

[NIN] The opposition in Serbia is mainly talking about the futility of spending time in the parliament. How do you evaluate the results of your work there?

[Agoston] The opposition parties in Serbia were too quick in allowing multiparty elections to be scheduled. Now the idea of withdrawing the opposition from the Assembly is always there. We have walked out several times. The Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians has behind it a decision of its congress that if there is a walkout from the Assembly, it will do the same as the opposition. So, if, say, the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] and the Democratic Party walk out, then we would also withdraw.

[NIN] Is it nevertheless better to be sitting in parliament, such as it is, and to be in the public eye? We already have such cases in Yugoslavia. For example, the Serbs in Croatia—they left the Croatian parliament; or in Montenegro, where the opposition left the parliament. After a few days, this is forgotten as though they had never been in the parliament at all.

[Agoston] It may seem strange, but I think that the situation in the parliament of Serbia is nevertheless different. A substantial number of the opposition deputies nevertheless constitute an intellectual force. Their proposals, especially the conversations of the chairmen of the deputy groups, the agreements before Assembly sessions, in a certain way nevertheless do influence the overall course of events. And the events on 9 March proved that.

[NIN] After the experience of several months in the Assembly, how do you look on the decision of the Albanians not to participate in elections? Did they perhaps make a mistake?

[Agoston] That is a rather difficult question. I think that a man cannot win a political battle if he is not on the battlefield.

[NIN] And in this time have you had any contacts with the Albanians?

[Agoston] No. Except in Vienna I did meet Mr. Rugova and we exchanged a few sentences. It is obvious that there are essential differences between our positions in Serbia, so that that contact could not be of much benefit to us.

[NIN] You have said that the positions of the Hungarians in Slovenia and Croatia are different than that of yours in Serbia. Could you explain to us those differences?

[Agoston] I think that there is a basic and determining difference: that is the size of those groupings. We number 340,000 in Serbia, 30,000 in Croatia, and about 16,000 in Slovenia. Objectively, our position is different: Here in Vojvodina we have decided to participate actively in the political life of Serbia. That is perhaps what is most essential for us. And we are trying to achieve independence. That is the big result of democratization in Serbia, in that it made it possible for us to do that. At the beginning, we emphasized that we wanted a different model for securing our ethnic rights. There are three areas important to us: education, culture, and information.

Along those lines, we proposed a concept of minority home rule on the principle of personnel. That is, it is not the territory that is essential to us, it is not borders that are essential to us, the essential thing is that the collectivity be able to shape itself as an entity, as an independent entity, in its essential activities.

[NIN] What exactly is meant by the formula "minority home rule on the principle of personnel"?

[Agoston] A minority council would be elected and would have its own bylaws. The bylaws would be adopted by the council, but confirmed by the Serbian Assembly. Thus, on the one hand the ethnic minority would exist as an independent political entity, while on the other the body of sovereign rights of the state would not be threatened. The state, that is, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, would have those essential rights of oversight and determination of the legal framework for the activity of minority home rule. Nevertheless, that framework would be sufficiently broad so that in those areas I have mentioned there could be effective self-organization. For instance, in the field of education we are preparing a concept of a network of Hungarian schools, practically from preschool institutions to the university. I think that we will be coming forth with this in a month at the most.

[NIN] The risk of that kind of schooling is neglect of the language in the environment where one lives. Later, this restricts communication, and there is less opportunity for employment.

[Agoston] First of all, we have no scientific studies whatsoever to confirm that thesis.

[NIN] So, where is that delicate border between preserving ethnic rights and the danger of ghettoization of a community?

[Agoston] We view all this in the context of developments in Europe and we are not afraid of ghettoization. The fact is that ghettoization is usually mentioned by those political forces which would like in that way to bring about a political control over the community or over the collectivity.

[NIN] Ghettoization is perhaps too strong a word, but let us say provincialization. Take, for example, the case of the theater in Subotica. When it was both Serbian and Hungarian, under the directorship of Ljubisa Ristic, it was one of the best theaters in central Europe. Then came your accusations that the Hungarian program had been driven out.... The Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, it seems, was in that instance defending its own local and small provincial point of support.

[Agoston] First of all, it should be said that this problem is older than the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians. And it is difficult to say what the outcome will be. In any case, a universality which stands in opposition to provincialism or the provincial opinion is something that represents a broader problem, which has been occurring in Europe, and, as far as I am aware, the provinces are becoming ever more important.

[NIN] What kind of Yugoslavia does the DZVM favor: a federation, confederation, or do you favor an independent Serbia?

[Agoston] Our point of departure is that it is in the collective interest of Hungarians for Yugoslavia to remain as a state community. We said that at the beginning, and there has been no change whatsoever in that respect. In practical terms, all the different alternatives suit us. The basic thing is that Yugoslavia as a whole nevertheless remains an international entity. We also have another position, one that was adopted at our congress, and that is that we do not interfere with the historical debate of the Yugoslav nationalities about a third Yugoslavia.

[NIN] Is that not a bit cynical? You are, after all, old settlers here. That state is nevertheless yours just like it is that of those others.

[Agoston] Our point of departure is the situation as it has been created. We feel that we did not create it. In this situation, it is openly said that the nationalities of this country are making the decision about Yugoslavia's destiny. As an ethnic minority, we must accept that fact whether we like it or not.

[NIN] If Yugoslavia ceases to exist, what is your position toward Serbia as a state?

[Agoston] If new states arise in that process with their own borders, we would look to see how the international community becomes involved. We would support those decisions.

[NIN] What stand do you take on some of the demands that have already been expressed for "correction" of the border between the present Yugoslavia, or Serbia, and Hungary?

[Agoston] We feel that Yugoslavia's international borders are something that no one is questioning at this time. We do not think that we constitute a political force that would make a decisive determination on that, nor do we think that we ought to take part in any political actions of our own.

[NIN] Do you Hungarians in Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Vojvodina feel the consequences of the foreign policy moves of the state of Hungary? We are referring to the sale of "kalashnikovs" to Croatia, to certain statements by official Hungarian sources which have met with harsh reactions here.

[Agoston] As for that sale of arms, it has been our opinion from the outset that everyone in those processes bears responsibility for his actions to his own citizens and also toward the international community. I would like to point out here the fact that we Hungarians from Yugoslavia were the first to demand in the right place, that is, in the Hungarian public, that this issue be thoroughly studied to establish whether this was in keeping with international principles. We should not, nor objectively can we, alter that basic position in this situation. We will continue to insist on peaceful means of resolving the present conflicts in Yugoslavia.

In the future, as I have said, and now this is perhaps already a reality, we are ready to accept life as citizens in a Serbia which will have its borders, in a Serbia which will be a separate state.

[NIN] On those occasions when the conflict between Serbia and Croatia becomes more tense and when the prevailing opinion here is that the Hungarian state has so far not been neutral on this issue, are you afraid that as an ethnic minority you could become hostages of a kind to the Serbian policy? Specifically, does it not bother you that the Hungarian Government is behaving as though Tudjman is more important to it than the 360,000 Hungarians in Serbia?

[Agoston] I would not be honest at all if I said that the Hungarians in Vojvodina do not feel any fear. Some citizens have even decided to seek the status of refugees in Hungary. To be sure, so far there are only 20 of them. I feel, however, that our political organization cannot follow that road. We must make a contribution to preserve community life in this region.

In contacts with official agencies of the Hungarian state, with individuals from those agencies, we always emphasize that they should not advocate one-sided decisions or

possibilities that would be contrary to our basic interests. In the talks which we had a few weeks ago in Budapest, we said that it would be good for us if in connection with these conflicts Hungarian diplomacy took positions strictly in accordance with the efforts of the political forces in the European Community.

[NIN] When you were in the Hungarian parliament, with whom did you meet?

[Agoston] We talked with the president of the parliament and with the presidents of the parties. We indicated to both what I have just said.

[NIN] You consider information to be an essential part of your concept. Hungarians have up to now had newspapers, radio stations....

[Agoston] First of all, we should distinguish two periods. Up to 1988, we had one model in the field of information which we think did not suit the basic interests of the Hungarian ethnic minority. As for the quantity, there were no problems, but we think that the news media do not represent the essential interests of Vojvodina Hungarians. Since 1988, there has been a change. We now feel that the news media financed from the budget ought to follow the broad positions defined by the Hungarian council.

Unfortunately, by our assessment the situation now is such that the news media in the Hungarian language are above all advocating the interests of the party in power, which is controlling the money.

[NIN] How do you look on the present position of Vojvodina in Serbia?

[Agoston] From the earliest activity of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, we have been favoring Vojvodina autonomy. That is a general position.

[NIN] What kind of autonomy?

[Agoston] Our point of departure is that Hungarians in Vojvodina do not constitute a majority. Accordingly, the content of autonomy and the method of achieving it are actually something that in our opinion should be the topic of a democratic agreement at the level of Vojvodina, and certainly in accordance with the general interests of the state of Serbia. It is a fact that in Vojvodina the so-called "autonomy-oriented parties" did not win a single seat in the elections. All these parties, the Alliance of Reform Forces [SRS], and the UJDI [Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative] did not take an altogether definite position on what kind of autonomy that should be. For us, the question is open at this time. We think that the charter of Vojvodina and the program of the government presented in the Serbian Assembly in essence do not suit our basic interests. We feel that that part of the concept which envisages or which did envisage districts would break up the Hungarians in Vojvodina into four regions and in that way would actually make it more difficult to pursue our collective

interests. It is our assessment that development nevertheless go in the direction of ever greater understanding of the need to begin an essential discussion of Vojvodina autonomy, including all the democratic forces in Vojvodina and in the Republic of Serbia.

[NIN] Nationalism is today "the greatest force" in this region. What proportions has nationalism attained with Hungarians?

[Agoston] It is certain that there have been individual statements which could be described as nationalistic. But those opinions cannot for a moment determine the political views of the DZVM. I know that in the public the entire orientation, the entire political activity, of the DZVM is described and labeled as nationalism. Right now, for instance, there is the accusation that we favor outright irredentism, treason, and high treason. I think that those are mainly the products of a political battle on a multiparty political scene in Serbia, and will continue to think so as long as there are no government measures standing behind those assertions. Those are rather crude opinions, but they are just political.

I conclude from the very fact that none of the members of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians has been criminally prosecuted that the state of Serbia at this point does take a democratic attitude toward us.

[NIN] And is there a differentiation into "true Hungarians" and "traitors" within the Hungarian nationality?

[Agoston] I can say with great satisfaction that we do not have that kind of differentiation.

[NIN] Nevertheless, we heard the other day from prestigious Hungarians in Subotica that they were experiencing unpleasantness because they had not been sufficiently good Hungarians for other members of their nationality.

[Agoston] It is difficult at this point to go into individual cases. I was speaking about the clearly defined political currents. But I know that there are those who think differently. There has been some criticism that we in the DZVM are too "soft," that we have taken a pro-Milosevic orientation....

[NIN] Are you as a party of an ethnic minority helped or hurt by Serbian nationalism? Is Serbian nationalism today homogenizing the Hungarians as well?

[Agoston] I must say that if anyone is homogenizing us, then it is the representatives of the leading party, with its serious attacks in the news media.

[NIN] What are your relations in practice with the agencies of the Serbian state on the territory of Vojvodina? As a deputy, you have met with the president of the republic several times, but we are not aware that the Vojvodina prime minister has ever summoned you.

[Agoston] The Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians has had contacts with certain high officials

in Vojvodina on certain specific occasions, but I have never managed to reach the president of the Assembly, the prime minister, or the president of the Presidency of Vojvodina. I would be less than sincere if I failed to say that I really did not try very hard.

[NIN] Why did you not try very hard?

[Agoston] I feel that the practical situation in Serbia is such that a useful dialogue can be conducted only with the agencies of the republic.

[NIN] How do you look on the possibility for resolving the grave Yugoslav crisis?

[Agoston] You know, I think that this will take a turn for the better. We all know that Andersen fairy tale "The Emperor's New Clothes." Perhaps the time has come for someone here to say: "The emperor is naked."

Regardless of what we think, neither Yugoslavia nor Serbia have full sovereignty, and we have been able to see that quite vividly precisely during these recent events. It is obvious that there are political forces in Europe that will be able to force us into rational behavior. I heard this morning that the value of stock had begun to drop on the stock exchange in Vienna

because of rumors that there was a possibility that Austria would become involved in certain military activities related to Yugoslavia.

And when it comes to the economic interests of those who are powerful, then in my opinion those interests will nevertheless be realized in the end. And the only rational approach is for us to recognize this as a fact and to get as much out of the situation as we can.

[NIN] How does your grouping in the Serbian parliament look on the demand for formation of a national salvation government, and would you be ready to enter such a government if you were offered a place in it?

[Agoston] We have not taken a position on that, but I am convinced that we would support such a decision. First, because this government is really not functioning as well as it might. Second, because in that way we probably would be able as a state to win certain unavoidable points in that great international political game. And third, if it really consisted of the most creative people, perhaps much more could be done even in this situation. As for our participation, I think that would not be realistic.

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